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INTRODUCTION

Immunity is everything that it’s cracked up to be. As politicians and
warlords have always known, those entitled to it enjoy protection from liability
that similarly-situated defendants do not;1 this is the case despite circumstances
that are practically identical, if not wholly so.2 The plaintiff is just as injured in
one situation as the other, but his remedy may be denied him based on whether
or not the party he complains of enjoys the coveted status.3
To counter this state of affairs, immunity is seldom granted, and it is
often only qualified immunity at that.4 The solitary body to which a blanket
immunity has always been granted in some form has been the sovereign itself.5
Whether under the historic justification that “the King can do no wrong,”6 or for
the practical reason that it is best to preserve the public treasury as much as
possible, the government—both federal and state—has deemed itself nearly
impregnable to actions taken against it.7 Of course, exceptions exist, but only
when the government deems that they do by way of a waiver.8
When it comes to negligence, the sovereign—again, both state and
federal—has generally granted that waiver—at least in America, that is.9 Tired
of the trouble it took to grant case-by-case pleas for redress, most of these
respective bodies have granted waivers by means of tort claims acts10—in which
1
See Katherine Florey, Sovereign Immunity’s Penumbras: Common Law, “Accident,” and
Policy in the Development of Sovereign Immunity Doctrine, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 765, 772–
73 (2008) (discussing the origins of sovereign immunity in American law).
2
See Erwin Chemerinsky, Against Sovereign Immunity, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1201, 1202 (2001)
(stating that “[t]he effect of sovereign immunity is to place the government above the law and to
ensure that some individuals who have suffered egregious harms will be unable to receive redress
for their injuries”).
3
See id.; see also JAMES M. WAGSTAFFE, RUTTER GROUP PRACTICE GUIDE: FEDERAL CIVIL
PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL ch. 2E § 12 (Nat’l Ed. 2015) (stating that “[t]he United States, including
its agency and employees, can be sued only to the extent that it has expressly waived its sovereign
immunity”).
4
Unlike absolute immunity, an immunity that is qualified creates only a presumption of the
immunized state, which can be overcome. Other than tort claims acts, types of qualified immunity
include those involving families, charities, worker’s compensation statutes, and state and local
governments. See VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, KATHRYN KELLY & DAVE F. PARTLETT, PROSSER, WADE,
AND SCHWARTZ’S TORTS: CASES AND MATERIALS, Chapter 12 § 3 (13th ed. 2015).
5

See Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 1201–03.
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 238,
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/blackstone_bk1ch7.asp (last visited Feb. 27, 2016).
7
See Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 1201–03.
6

8

See WAGSTAFFE, supra note 3, at ch. 2E § 12 (providing the list of waivers to sovereign
immunity).
9

See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2014).
The Federal Tort Claims Act is located at 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2014); a table consisting
of citations to state tort claims acts, as well as their discretionary function exception sections, has
10
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the state deigns to be sued, generally, on any grounds that the courts recognize
under the common law.11 Where a tort claims act exists, no longer does the ageold obstacle of the defendant’s status stand in the way of a recovery.12 Plaintiffs
are free to proceed with their proof of duty, breach of duty, and damages. 13
Considering just the number of federal workers in America, potential liabilities
in the area are staggering:
[d]uring recent years it has not been uncommon to find that there
were some 3,000 lawsuits against the United States under the
Federal Tort Claims Act pending before the federal courts at one
time involving claims of approximately $5 billion. New suits are
filed at the rate of more than 1,500 each year. Administrative
claims, presented by claimants each year to federal agencies
which is a prerequisite to filing suit, number some 10 to 20 times
this amount.14
If state claims figures were added, several more sets of commas and zeroes could
be added to the tally.
However, what the state grants, it can also take away. And when it comes
to matters that require discretion, the state will argue most stridently that the
waiver should not take effect. Under what is generally known as a “discretionary
function exception,”15 ( “DFE”) courts must dismiss actions that amount to no
more than second-guessing the defendant’s judgment on some matter that the
plaintiff claims led to his injury.16 In other words, if a plaintiff asserts that he was
injured because a government-owned park road was not marked a certain way,
or because a certain government-owned trail was not closed, both discretionary
actions, then the defendant’s judgment about whether to mark the road or close
the trail is not open to debate.17

been compiled by the National Conference of State Legislatures. JAIME RALL, NATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, WEATHER OR NOT? STATE LIABILITY AND ROAD WEATHER
INFORMATION
SYSTEMS
(RWIS)
(April
2010),
http://www.ncsl.org/documents/transportation/Weather_or_Not_App_B_Rall_04.30.10.pdf.
11

See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2014).
See Nicole Melvani, The Fourteenth Exception: How the Feres Doctrine Improperly Bars
Medical Malpractice Claims of Military Service Members, 46 CAL. W. L. REV. 395, 399–400
(2010).
12

13

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 3 (AM. LAW INST. 2010).
1 LESTER S. JAYSON & HON. ROBERT C. LONGSTRETH, HANDLING FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS
§1.01, at 1–8 (2014).
15
See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2014).
14

16

See generally JAYSON & LONGSTRETH, supra note 14, § 12.03.
See, e.g., Childers v. United States, 40 F.3d 973, 975–76 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that the
decision not to post warning signs in the national park was protected by DFE).
17
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However, if the case in question involves non-compliance with a
mandatory matter (i.e., a rule that the government made and then broke), the
question of policy never enters the picture.18 Thus, the DFE does not come into
play and the plaintiff may proceed to his proofs.
To put it another way, although a plaintiff cannot argue “you should have
done a better job of it,” which amounts to second-guessing the government in
matters of judgment and is disallowed under the DFE,19 the plaintiff can argue
that “you didn’t do what you said you would,” which will lead to government
liability, if proven.20 A government that did not follow its own rule is open to
that charge; as such, the waiver will apply.21
But therein lies the question in such matters: does the case involve a
government-made rule? This precipitates yet another question: what exactly is a
“rule,” in the sense meant in this context? Or, to put it another way, what is a
“mandate” and what is only a “guideline”? When is something an
order/directive/charge, a failure in the observance of which will be addressed
under most iterations of tort claims acts, and when is it merely a
suggestion/counsel/resolution, which will require a further inquiry—whether the
matter is policy-related, and therefore the subject of discretion for which the
government does not waive its immunity?22 With so much turning upon how a
statement is communicated, what are the criteria by which courts can make an
objective analysis, one based upon scientific factors that will bring a muchneeded level of clarity to this cloudy area?
As to the two-prong test of the DFE—1) whether the government
statement is a mandate or a guideline; and 2) whether that statement is policy
related—much has been written about the second question—the nature of policy
matters, particularly with regard to the Federal Tort Claims Act (the “FTCA”).23
According to the Supreme Court, the purpose of the discretionary function exception is “to
prevent ‘judicial second-guessing’ of legislative and administrative decisions grounded in social,
economic, and political policy through the medium of an action in tort.” United States v. S.A.
Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797, 814 (1984).
18

19

See id. at 814.
See Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536 (1988) (stating that “the discretionary
function exception will not apply when a federal statute, regulation, or policy specifically
prescribes a course of action for an employee to follow.”).
20

21
22
23

See id.
See Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 814.

As stated by the Supreme Court in the seminal case, Berkovitz, there are two questions that
must be satisfied before the government must meet in order to successfully invoke the discretionary
function exception: (1) “whether the action is a matter of choice for the acting employee;” and (2)
“whether that judgment is of the kind that the discretionary function exception was designed to
shield.” Representative articles analyzing the Discretionary Function Exception’s policy prong
include: Andrew Hyer, The Discretionary Function Exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act: A
Proposal for a Workable Analysis, 2007 BYU L. REV. 1091; Mark C. Niles, “Nothing but
Mischief”: The Federal Tort Claims Act and the Scope of Discretionary Immunity, 54 ADMIN. L.
REV. 1275 (2002); Bruce A. Peterson & Mark E. Van Der Weide, Susceptible to Faulty Analysis:
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But little has been written about the first question, related to whether alleged
breaches should be considered mandates or only guidelines. Since the second
question is only reached by going through the first,24 the matter is no small thing.
But all in all, the courts have bumbled around with the issue.25 They have been
no more direct in articulating their analyses of it than the parties to such lawsuits
have been in arguing that a particular government statement was either an
absolute directive or only a passing recommendation.26 The analysis must begin
and end with more than charges that “they had to do it!” and “we did not!”
This Article intends to bring some order to the discussion, both by means
of explaining what the science of the language arts—linguistics—says about the
matter, and by explaining how that science comports with what courts think they
are doing when they determine a government statement is, or is not, a mandate.
Linguists have considered language crimes before,27 relating to perjury, bribery,
and criminal threats,28 and I myself have conducted a linguistic analysis with
regard to the civil law Tarasoff context (i.e., “duties to warn”29), but a linguistic
analysis of mandates as opposed to guidelines has not yet been attempted.
Part II will explain the background involving the Federal Tort Claims
Act and its state law counterparts, particularly with regard to the development of
the DFE. Part III will demonstrate what mandates mean by the employment of
speech act theory and the concept of implicature, both of which are dimensions
of pragmatics,30 itself the branch of linguistics dedicated to explaining how
language functions in context.31 Part IV will demonstrate the type of analysis that
the courts have used in determining whether a government statement is a
mandate or a guideline. Part V will set out an analytical framework—a set of
factors—for courts to use in determining this issue, based both upon the
pragmatic study conducted in Part III, and upon a formalization of what
precedent shows the courts have been doing, which is the subject of Part IV. This
part will also prioritize the factors, suggest a rationale for their application, and
explain how they comport with other tools of statutory interpretation and
construction. Part VI will conclude.
United States v. Gaubert and the Resurrection of Federal Sovereign Immunity, 72 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 447 (1997); Donald N. Zillman, Protecting Discretion: Judicial Interpretation of the
Discretionary Function Exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 47 ME. L. REV. 365 (1995).
24
See Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536.
25
26

See cases cited infra note 319.
See cases cited infra note 319.

27
See ROGER W. SHUY, LANGUAGE CRIMES: THE USE AND ABUSE OF LANGUAGE EVIDENCE IN
THE COURTROOM, at xvi-xvii (1996).
28

See id. at 20, 97, 136.
See A.G. Harmon, Back from Wonderland: A Linguistic Approach to Duties Arising from
Threats of Physical Violence, 37 CAP. U.L. REV. 27, 34 (2008).
30
See id. at 36–37.
29

31

See id. at 34.
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II. THE HISTORY OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY, TORT CLAIMS ACTS, AND THE
DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION EXCEPTION
As mentioned above, the concept of sovereign immunity is historically
grounded in the doctrine of the divine right of kings.32 This theological and
political concept is of ancient lineage, by most accounts traced from Justinian33
down through centuries of development and elaboration from ecclesiastical
law.34 English jurisprudence kept the idea alive through various iterations,35 and
the concept developed in America by way of a trio of cases36 that were based on
what one judge considered purely practical grounds37preserving the ability of
government to function:
[e]very government has an inherent right to protect itself against
suits, and if, in the liberality of legislation, they are permitted, it
is only on such terms and conditions as are prescribed by statute.
The principle is fundamental, applies to every sovereign power,
and but for the protection which it affords, the government
would be unable to perform the various duties for which it was
created. It would be impossible for it to collect revenue for its
support, without infinite embarrassments and delays, if it was
subject to civil processes the same as a private person.38
Thus, although political policy replaced ecclesiastical imprimatur, the
consequence was the same.39 There are many demands upon the contents of the
governmental purse,40 and a reluctance to make disbursals is a natural reaction,

32

See generally Herbert Barry, The King Can Do No Wrong, 11 VA. L. REV. 349 (1924–1925);
Stanwood R. Duval, Sovereign Immunity, Anachronistic or Inherent: A Sword or a Shield?, 84
TUL. L. REV. 1471 (2010); George W. Pugh, Historical Approach to the Doctrine of Sovereign
Immunity, 13 LA. L. REV. 476 (1953); Guy I. Seidman, The Origins of Accountability: Everything
I Know About the Sovereign’s Immunity, I Learned from King Henry III, 49 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 393
(2005).
33
Seidman, supra note 32, at 415–16.
34
35

Id. at 409.
Id. at 402–30.

36
The Siren, 74 U.S. 152 (1868); Gibbons v. United States, 75 U.S. 269 (1868); Nichols v.
United States, 74 U.S. 122 (1868). According to the leading treatise on the FTCA, the idea of
sovereign immunity, though not expressly stated in the Constitution, is derived by implication.
JAYSON & LONGSTRETH, supra note 14, §2.01 (citing Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 321
(1934); Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 306 U.S. 381, 388 (1939); Williams v.
United States, 289 U.S. 553, 577 (1933)).
37
Duval, supra note 32, at 1477–78; see JAYSON & LONGSTRETH, supra note 14, § 2.01 (stating
other justifications for the doctrine).
38
39
40

Nichols, 74 U.S. at 126.
See Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 1201–03.
See JAYSON & LONGSTRETH, supra note 14, § 1.01, at 1–8.
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even when fraud—an ever-present concern when the public fisc is involved41—
is not the case.
Of course, such a practical stance has its drawbacks—namely, the fact
that the government, through its agents, can and does hurt people.42 To deal with
this reality, the first way around the doctrine was by means of private legislation,
sponsored by a legislator.43 This means was subject to all of the delays,
objections, and frustrations commensurate with a legislative body conducting
what in effect amounts to judicial determinations.44 From the federal
perspective,45 complaints about the process began at least in the administration
of John Quincy Adams, carried through to the administration of Millard
Fillmore,46 and ultimately led to the establishment of the Court of Claims Act in
1885.47
The problem with the aforesaid act was that although it relieved
Congress of investigating claims against the government, the court itself could
not act upon those deliberations.48 Judgments still had to be rendered by
Congress.49 This only had the effect of postponing the delay of justice to a later
date, and the amount of time Congress spent on reviewing the record amassed by
the Court was no less burdensome than its prior investigatory role.50 Most
importantly for the tort claimant, the Court of Claims Act did not confer
jurisdiction to hear tort claims.51 A legislative attempt to remedy that problem,
by including tort claims jurisdiction in the Tucker Act of 1887, was

41

See James B. Helmer, Jr., False Claims Act: Incentivizing Integrity for 150 Years for
Rogues, Privateers, Parasites and Patriots, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 1261, 1261–62 (2013).
42

See, e.g., Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 533, 547 (stating plaintiff’s allegations
that the federal agency acted wrongly by approving the release of polio vaccine that caused a two
month infant to contract polio disease, and further holding that the complaint survived the
government’s motion to dismiss based on the DFE); Sutton v. Earles, 26 F.3d 903, 910 (9th Cir.
1994) (holding that the Navy was negligent in its failure to post a warning sign, and that such
failure caused an accident, in which several people died).
43
See Walter Gellhorn & Louis Lauer, Congressional Settlement of Tort Claims Against the
United States, 55 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (1955).
44

See generally Private Bills in Congress, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1684 (1966).
Not a great deal has been written about the history of state tort claims act. But see Lauren
K. Robel, Sovereignty and Democracy: The States’ Obligations to Their Citizens Under Federal
Statutory Law, 78 IND. L.J. 543, 547–53 (2003).
45

46
47

JAYSON & LONGSTRETH, supra note 14, §2.02, at 2–6 to 2–7.
Id.

48

Id. § 2.03, at 2–9 (citing United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128, 144 (1872)).
Id. (stating that “[the court’s] decisions . . . were subject to the approval or disapproval of
Congress”).
50
Id. at 2–10.
49

51

Id. at 2–11.
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unsuccessful.52 Enacting various carve outs permitting tort claims in limited
areas was the pattern over the successive years,53 but no comprehensive reform
was proposed until after the events of 1945.54
That year, in a tragedy grimly reminiscent of 9/11 in many ways—other
than the fact that it occurred by accident, not terrorist design—a U.S. army
bomber lost its way in a dense fog and crashed into the Empire State building.55
Many people were killed and property damage was extensive.56 The idea that
because the plane was federally-owned, the suits against the government for
damages were barred, did not sit well with either the claimants or the public.57
Twelve months later, the Federal Tort Claims Act was passed in August of
1946,58 permitting suit in tort against the federal government:
[s]ubject to the provisions of chapter 171 of this title, the district
courts, together with the United States District Court for the
District of the Canal Zone and the District Court of the Virgin
Islands, shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on
claims against the United States, for money damages, accruing
on and after January 1, 1945, for injury or loss of property, or
personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act
or omission of any employee of the Government while acting
within the scope of his office or employment, under
circumstances where the United States, if a private person,
would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the
place where the act or omission occurred.59
But just as the government granted jurisdiction to sue as a general principle, it
also reserved that immunity in certain cases by way of exception—a tactic that

52
53
54
55

Id. §2.04, at 2–17.
Id.
Id. at 2–18.
Id. §2.01, at 2–3.

56
See Gregory C. Sisk, The Continuing Drift of Federal Sovereign Immunity Jurisprudence,
50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 517, 535 (2008) (stating that “ten people on the ground, in addition to
the flight crew of the American military aircraft, lost their lives, others were injured, and substantial
property damage resulted”).
57
JAYSON & LONGSTRETH, supra note 14, § 2.01, at 2–3 (stating that “[t]he victims of this
frightful accident must have been shocked . . . that there was no judicial remedy available to them
through which they could recover damages from the United States Government”). Before the
FTCA, the only remedy available to the victims of the government’s employees’ tortious acts was
to petition the Congress for the passage of a private bill. Century long deliberations in Congress
and many victims with no redress led to the enactment of the FTCA. Id. at 2–4.
58

Id. at 2–3.
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2014). For the legislative history of the FTCA, see JAYSON &
LONGSTRETH, supra note 14, §§ 2.09–2.13.
59

.input.476722.Gd9is (DO NOT DELETE)

CONVERTDOC

108

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

3/14/2016 4:44 PM

[Vol. 118

is a constant theme in this area.60 Among that list is the DFE61: “[a]ny claim . . .
based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a
discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of
the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.”62
As stated above, the application of this exception required the courts to
develop a two-prong test: 1) “whether the action is a matter of choice for the
acting employee;” and 2) “whether the judgment is of the kind that the
discretionary function exception was designed to shield.”63
The first prong, “whether the action is a matter of choice” (i.e., whether
it is a mandate or not) is the subject of this article’s inquiry.
III. LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS OF MANDATES
Before turning to an analysis of what courts have done and are doing in
their assessments of statements in the DFE context, this part will explain what
the field of language studies can contribute to such an analysis. Indeed, a
linguistic breakdown of the matters involved can help determine how a particular
statement is functioning in the language, providing scientific explanations for
that inquiry that other approaches cannot.64 The most useful field of linguistics
for this inquiry is that of pragmatics,65 but the field of syntax can also play an
important role.66
A. Pragmatics
Pragmatics is devoted to the study of language in a situational context,
as opposed to the study of its structure.67 As such, it explains the way language
60

See generally JAYSON & LONGSTRETH, supra note 14, §§ 2.01–2.10 (discussing sovereign
immunity of the government and the gradual development of the waiver to it, which was subject
to many limitations and specific circumstances at various stages of its development).
61
For the full list of statutory exceptions, see 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (2014). Implied exclusions are
discussed in JAYSON & LONGSTRETH, supra note 14, § 11.03.
62
63

28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2014).
Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536 (1988).

64
See SHUY, supra note 27, at 1–2 (discussing the importance of language analysis in criminal
cases, and stating that “the field of law must rely on what is known about how language works in
order to evaluate legal evidence which just happens to be in the form of language”).
65
See Harmon, supra note 29, at 34 (discussing the usefulness of pragmatics as study of
language in context as applied to the duty to warn).
66
See, e.g., Craig Hoffman, When Worldviews Collide: Linguistic Theory Meets Legal
Semantics in United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 73 WASH. U.L.Q. 1215, 1219 (1995)
(discussing the connection between the legal statutory interpretation and syntax, and stating that
“the syntax and the legal principles work together to form an integrated interpretation of the
statute.”).
67

See Harmon, supra note 29, at 34.
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is used (i.e., in conversation, spoken or written),68 not how it is made (i.e., its
component parts, the arrangement of those parts, etc.), which is the purview of
grammar.69 When the question is whether a certain statement qualifies as a
mandate or a guideline, as it is in tort claims cases concerning the DFE,70
pragmatics can supply the necessary analytical tools for both the advocates and
for the decision-maker.71 In other words, if the litigants in a tort claims contest
are arguing about whether a certain statement was mandatory or merely
precatory, pragmatics can supply legitimate evidence to be used by both parties
in arguing their positions, as well as a scientific means for a court to use when
faced with making that assessment. At this juncture, two important areas of
pragmatics must be explained: speech acts and implicature.
1. Speech Acts
In his work How to Do Things with Words,72 philosopher John Austin
demonstrated that while some statements seek to describe a reality—and can be
judged as “true” or “false”—other statements not only say something, but also
do something.73 For example, if one party makes a promise to another party, he
not only says the words “I promise X,” but by using those words in the present
tense, in fact makes that promise.74 Indeed, it is impossible to make a promise
without uttering the requisite words in the prescribed way;75 synonyms may be
employed—“pledge” or “vow,” etc.—or even signs substituted for spoken
speech (the gesture of a cross made over the heart, for instance), but the
expression of the promise must be made to communicate that promise;76 if it is,
nothing more need be done, for the promise is made by the very act of its
utterance.77 It is a fully integrated, existential, metaphysical occurrence.

See id. at 34 (stating that “pragmatics can help establish whether the triggering event [of
duty to warn] occurred or not” analyzing what has been said and heard in the “situational context”).
69
See Craig Hoffman, Parse the Sentence First: Curbing the Urge to Resort to the Dictionary
When Interpreting Legal Texts, 6 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 401, 403 (2003).
70
See Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536 (1988) (stating the first prong of the test
to determine whether DFE applies).
71
See generally Harmon, supra note 29 (discussing the usefulness of pragmatics in
determining whether the duty to warn was triggered).
72
J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS 14 (2d ed. 1975).
68

73
74

Id. at 98–99.
Id. at 7.

75

See Harmon, supra note 29, at 40–41 (explaining that by uttering the apology in the present,
the accountant not only said it, but also did iti.e., “apologized”).
76

See id.
See id. at 40 n.59 (“Austin termed such acts ‘performatives,’ i.e., locutions that ‘perform’
the act that they name.”).
77
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This is only one type of speech act, and a particularly special kind at
that;78 there are many others, as will be explained below, but at this point it is
important to appreciate the gravity of Austin’s contribution. For our lives revolve
around what we do with words. As linguist Anna Wierzbicka points out, in a way
that particularly resonates with the tort claims DFE context:
from morning to night, we seek to interpret what other people
are saying, i.e, what kinds of speech acts they are performing.
Virtually every time someone opens his or her mouth in our
presence, we seek to categorize their utterance as this or that
kind of speech act. Was this a threat? Or just a warning? Was
this a suggestion or rather a request? Was this a criticism or just
a casual remark? Was this a hint? . . . The difference between a
threat and a warning may be a matter of life or death; the
difference between demand and suggest may be a matter of bad
relations or good relations with another person. (“I wasn’t
demanding anything, I was just suggesting. . . .”).79
Further, when it comes to the law, what is done with words is the whole point.80
In fact, the question of the mandatory/precatory nature of the speech acts in the
tort claims context is the difference between immunity and potential liability. 81
Everything hinges upon the determination.82

78

Id. at 40.
ANNA WIERZBICKA, ENGLISH SPEECH ACT VERBS: A SEMANTIC DICTIONARY 3–4 (1987). Dr.
Wiersbicka adds “[i]t would not be an exaggeration to say that public life can be conceived as a
gigantic network of speech act. History itself seems to consist largely in acts of speech acts (threats,
condemnations, offers, demands, negotiations, agreements, and so on).” Id. at 3. The aptness of
this phrase to the legal context is apparent, as the law deals essentially with offers, promises,
demands, threats, warnings, bribes, etc.
80
See, e.g., Robert F. Blomquist, The F-Word: A Jurisprudential Taxonomy of American
Morals (In a Nutshell), 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 65, 74 (1999) (citing B.E.S. v. State, 629 So. 2d
761, 764–765 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993) (where the court examined the nature of the words uttered
by the defendant and stated that depending on the status of the addressee and ordinary human
perception, the words could or could not provoke physical violent response by the addressee)); C.
O. Wolfe, Property—Limitation of Estates—Rule in Shelley’s Case—Remainders—Statute of
Limitations as Affecting Same, 1 TEX. L. REV. 316, 316 (1923) (giving an example of the deed of
conveyance and stating that “[t]he primary principle adopted by the courts in the construction of
written instruments is to gather, as nearly as possible, from language used in the instrument itself
the intent of the maker.”).
81
See Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536 (1988) (stating that “conduct cannot be
discretionary unless it involves an element of judgment or choice,” and that “[DFE] will not apply
when a federal statute, regulation, or policy specifically prescribes a course of action for an
employee to follow. In this event, the employee has no rightful option but to adhere to the
directive.”).
79

82

See id.
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Types of Speech Acts

To return to the explanation of speech act theory, some definitions and
distinctions are crucial.83 First, any statement, whether made by an individual or
a group, involves two things: the locutionary act (i.e., what is said) and the
illocutionary act (i.e., what is done; in the above example, the promise).84
Second, a particular illocutionary act can fall into one of several categories,
depending upon what kind of illocutionary force is intended by the speaker (i.e.,
the objective sought), be it a question, a confession, a demand, etc.85 Although
there are many classifications of illocutionary acts,86 Austin’s pupil, philosopher
John Searle, set up a classification that will be followed in this analysis.87 I have
used the following examples for the types of illocutionary acts in another article
and quote them here for ease of reference88:
1. Representatives: A statement by which speakers commit
themselves to the truth of the proposition made.E.g., “The
sky is blue.” (Under this category would fit illocutionary acts
such as asserting, confessing, admitting, forecasting, etc.)89
2. Directives: A statement by which speakers intend to get their
hearers to do something. E.g., “Go to the grocery store for
me.” (Under this category would fit illocutionary acts such as
insisting, demanding, requesting, advising, etc.)90
3. Commissives: A statement by which speakers commit
themselves to certain expressed acts. E.g., “I’ll help you with
your homework.” (Under this category would fit
illocutionary acts such as promising, vowing, pledging,
etc.)91

83
84
85
86

See AUSTIN, supra note 72, at 98.
Id. at 98–99.
Id.
Id.

87
John R. Searle, A Classification of Illocutionary Acts, 5 LANGUAGE SOC’Y 1 (1976). Searle
is of the opinion that the basic unit of human linguistic communication is the illocutionary act. Id.
88
89

See Harmon, supra note 29, at 41.
Id; see also Searle, supra note 87, at 1.

90
Harmon, supra note 29, at 41. Searle includes questions—requests for informationas
directives. Searle, supra note 87, at 11.
91

Consider the following:
Searle notes G.E.M. Anscombe’s point that each illocutionary act seeks either
to match the “world to the words” (I am going to make my statement come
true in the world) or the “words to the world” (I am going to make my words
resemble some truth in the world). A mandate, as a directive, seeks to bring
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4. Expressives: A statement by which speakers convey their
internal psychological states or feelings. E.g., “You have my
sympathy for your loss.” (Under this category would fit
illocutionary acts such as apologizing, congratulating,
condoling, objecting, etc.)92
5. Declarations: A statement by which speakers change the
status of some entity. E.g., “You’re under arrest.” (Under this
category would fit illocutionary acts such as christening,
surrendering, excluding, bestowing, etc.).93
Apropos to the tort claims DFE analysis, a “mandate”94 would be
classified as a “directive,” as the speaker is ordering another to do something. 95
Interestingly, a mere suggestion is also a type of directive, but does not have the
power that the mandate does.96 That is, it seeks to influence behavior (i.e., to gain
what is sought), but it does not command/order that it be done.97 A suggestion
offers an array of things and highlights them as particularly apt or illustrative,
but it falls short of saying that those things must come to be.98 In other words,
the suggestion paints out a picture, points to it and says “this is the kind of thing
that ought to be done”;99 a mandate, on the other hand, chisels out a sculpture,
points to it and says “this is the very thing that must be done.”100
It is important to understand that a suggestion may vary in emphasis;101
it may even be strongly or emphatically stated, but it always falls short of a

the proposed act objectively true in the world by way of ordering the behavior,
and therefore its “direction of fit” is “world to the words.”
Harmon, supra note 29, at 41 n.65; see generally G.E.M. ANSCOMBE, INTENTION (1957).
92
Harmon, supra note 29, at 41; Searle, supra note 87, at 12.
93

Harmon, supra note 29, at 42; Searle, supra note 87, at 13.
The word “mandate” is being used for simplicity’s sake, and is meant to be synonymous
with “order,” “command,” “direct,” etc. Similarly, “guideline” will be used as a general term that
stands in for “suggestion,” “advisement,” “counsel,” “principle,” etc.
94

95

Searle, supra note 87, at 11.
See id. (“They may be very modest ‘attempts’ as when I invite you to do it or suggest that
you do it . . . .”).
97
See infra Part III.A.1.v (describing the classifications of verbs by groups).
96

See infra Part III.A.1.v and text accompanying note 137 (defining “suggest” as a verb in the
“advise” group).
98

99
100

See infra text accompanying notes 134–139.
See Searle, supra note 87, at 11.

101
Compare Freeman v. United States, 556 F.3d 326, 338 (5th Cir. 2009) (“The ostensibly
mandatory language ‘is required’ . . . did nothing more than explain the needs that arise in an
emergency”), with Miller v. United States, 163 F.3d 591, 594–95 (1998) (holding that the language
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mandate.102 Note that in another example, the “demand” is also a directive, but
even though it is more strongly stated (and the context is usually one in which
the speaker is asking for the fulfillment of something to which he claims
entitlement), the degree of emphasis and even the pique with which the statement
is made do not turn it into a mandate.103 For the latter, there must be some power
over the hearer.104 That is a condition of that category and one of several that a
particular statement must meet to qualify as such.105
ii. Illocutionary Force
For a locutionary act to have the intended illocutionary force, Austin
determined that certain conditions must be met.106 Depending upon the particular
class, these conditions decide whether a statement is “felicitous” (i.e., has the
requisite of illocutionary force), or is “infelicitous.”107 I have explained the kinds
of felicity conditions in an earlier article and quote that explanation here, with its
list of pertinent examples108:
1. Preparatory Conditions: condition(s) that precede the
utterance. E.g., for a valid confession (in the religious
sense), the penitent must have done something wrong under
the code of his faith.
2. Sincerity Conditions: conditions that relate to the speaker’s
state of mind.
E.g., for a valid confession (in the religious sense),
the penitent must be truly sorry for the wrong he has done.
3. Essential Conditions: conditions that require the utterance
be recognizable as the type of illocutionary act in question.
E.g., for a valid confession (in the religious sense),
the penitent must express his contrition in a
confessional booth or some other dedicated space,

of the Manual “initial attack response may vary depending on availability of resources” was
discretionary).
See infra text accompanying note 139 (stating the difference between “order” and ask”).
While a demand in the strictest sense may imply that exact kind of power, it is often used in
a sense that makes it synonymous with “insist.” See infra notes 124–126 and accompanying text.
104
See infra text accompanying notes 123–129 (describing the “order” group).
102
103

105
See Harmon, supra note 29, at 42–43 (describing the conditions that must be met in order
for the utterance to have the desired effect on the hearer).
106
107
108

JOHN R. SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS: AN ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 60 (1969).
Id. at 54–71.
Harmon, supra note 29, at 42–43 (internal citations omitted).
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to a priest or minister, using language or formulary
phrases that imply regret —”I confess that . . .”
4. Propositional Content Conditions: conditions that relate to
the proper context of the statement..
E.g., for a valid confession (in the religious sense), the
penitent’s utterance must predicate the penitent’s past act—
“I’m sorry that I lied to my wife.”
Again, each speech act has its own set of these conditions, which must
be met for them to have the intended illocutionary force.109
iii. Perlocutionary Effect
One other feature of speech acts must be explained before proceeding to
set out the felicity conditions for a mandate. Distinct from both the locutionary
act (the utterance) and the illocutionary act (the force of that utterance) is what
Austin termed the perlocutionary effect (i.e., the effect that the utterance has on
the hearer)—such as the elicitation of concern, pity, surprise, delight, etc.110 The
perlocutionary effect is what the speech act creates;111 if the illocutionary force
is the pistol’s report,112 the perlocutionary effect is the runners starting from their
blocks.113
In the DFE context, the directive mandate should have the perlocutionary
effect of compliance with the content of the locution. That is, if the mandate is
“pave the road with asphalt and mark it every two miles with road markers,” the
subordinate will have to do what the mandate requires (or suffer the
consequences of non-compliance, whatever they may be—reprimand, demotion,
fine, discharge, etc.). Evidence that there was no repercussion for noncompliance (i.e., that there was no enforcement) might refute the sincerity
condition.114 In other words, a claim that “nobody ever did X because they (those
in a position of authority over the matter) never enforced X, and so nobody ever
took X seriously,” if supported by evidence of such non-feasance, would go some
The following is also illuminative: “The primary function of speech act verbs consist in
interpreting people’s speech acts, not in performing speech acts.” WIERZBICKA, supra note 79, at
16.
110
AUSTIN, supra note 72, at 101–08.
109

111

See id.
See id. at 98–99 (defining the illocutionary force as intention of the speaker to provoke
certain kind of behavior).
113
See id. at 101 (defining the perlocutionary effect as the effect the speaker’s words have on
the addressee).
114
See Harmon, supra note 29, at 43 (defining “sincerity condition” as “relat[ing] to the
speaker’s state of mind”).
112
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way towards showing that the statement was not a true directive at all. The
speaker would be estopped from saying a mandate existed if he never treated it
as such himself.
Indeed, the failure to enforce a mandate might affect the recognizability
of future, similar mandates. That is, an unenforced “directive” might become
such a scarecrow that similar “directives” would not be taken seriously,
regardless of how they were “put”; the perlocutionary effect of non-enforcement
could compromise the essential condition with regard to even a more boldly
stated directive: it would not be recognizable anymore because the force behind
it would not be feared or respected, leading to a consequent non-compliance with
its propositional content.115 A lack of enforcement might also affect the
preparatory condition of future, similar “directives,” in that the speaker would
have lost his authority to be heard;116 if the king does not wield his sword, he
loses the power to speak his word.
iv. Felicity Conditions: Mandates
With this general appreciation of felicity conditions and perlocutionary
effects, it is now possible to construct a scheme of felicity conditions for a
mandate that would trigger liability under a typical tort claims act:
1. Preparatory Conditions:


The mandate must be spoken by the proper party (i.e., a
mandate cannot be given by one who does not have the
authority to speak);



The mandate must be directed toward the proper party
(a mandate cannot be followed unless the hearer is both
in a position to do what is mandated and is obligated in
some way to perform what is done).

115
“The Boy Who Cried Wolf,” one of Aesop’s Fables, is an example of the perlocutionary
effect described here. See BEN EDWIN PERRY, BABRIUS AND PHAEDRUS 462 (1965). Fear of “course
of dealing” has instigated the “No Implied Waiver” or “No Oral Modifications” clauses in
contracts, forbidding the interpretation of leniency in one instance as being precedent for future
leniency. See CHARLES M. FOX, WORKING WITH CONTRACTS: WHAT LAW SCHOOL DOESN’T TEACH
YOU 248 (2002); however, such attempts to restrict the parties’ freedom to contract can be found
impermissible. See, e.g., Hovnanian Land Inv. Grp. v. Annapolis Towne Ctr. at Parole, LLC, 25
A.3d 967, 983 (Md. 2010) (holding such a clause unenforceable).
116
See Harmon, supra note 29, at 42–43 (defining “preparatory conditions” as “condition[s]
that precede the utterance,” and explaining by means of an example that before a sin is confessed,
a sin must be done. Therefore, a commitment of sin is a preparatory condition to utterance of
confession.).

.input.476722.Gd9is (DO NOT DELETE)

CONVERTDOC

116

3/14/2016 4:44 PM

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 118

2. Sincerity Conditions:


This condition relates to the earnestness of the speaker,
and can be refuted by evidence that shows the
perlocutionary effect of the statement was not that of a
directive (as explained above).117 If the supposed
mandate was never enforced, and if the hearers did not
take the speaker seriously, the effect of the speech act
belies the sincerity of the locution.118

3. Essential Conditions:


The mandate must use language that denotes an
imperative, whether communicated directly or
indirectly.



The mandate must be specific (orders require action,
and unless they can be carried out explicitly, they do not
qualify as orders).



The mandate must take the proper form (the more
formal the communication, the more recognizable it is
as a mandate—e.g., a statement made in an official
employee handbook regarding “duties” as opposed to an
offhand remark made during a lunch break).119

4. Propositional Content Condition:


117
118
119

The content of the mandate must predicate that a future
course of action be taken.120 Of all the conditions, this is
the least debatable in the terms of the DFE context, since
both mandates and guidelines are future-oriented, and
the immediacy of the mandate or guideline (i.e.,
whether it mandates/suggests something be done as
soon as possible or over a span of time) does not alter
its character.

See discussion supra Part III.A.1.iii and note 114.
See discussion supra Part III.A.1.iii and note 114.
Arguably, the form that the statement takes is also a preparatory condition.

120
Similarly, the propositional context condition, one of the felicity conditions, “relate[s] to the
proper context of the statement.” Harmon, supra note 29, at 43. Some event must take place before
a certain statement is made, which affirms the occurrence of the event. See id.
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If any of these conditions is not met, the attempted communication of a
mandate is “infelicitous”;121 as such, it is not a directive at all.
v. Semantics
With regard to the essential conditions, particularly with regard to the
imperatives used, a diversion into the field of semantics is important. Semantics
is the field of language studies concerned with meaning.122 As such, a taxonomy
of imperatives/orders, which can be used in the construction of a mandate, as
well as a taxonomy of requests/advisements, which cannot, will be useful in the
analysis to follow.
In her dictionary of speech act verbs, Dr. Wierzbicka breaks imperatives
into a group of “Order” words and explains the underlying set of assumptions in
each. I have selected the following, along with Dr. Wierzbicka’s illuminating
commentary, to create a taxonomy. The entrants listed here go some ways
towards satisfying a component of the essential condition for a mandate. Some
of these words will be more commonly used than others in the tort claims context
(some will in fact rarely be used), as government statements that purportedly
require compliance are most often written, rather than communicated orally.
However, with this caveat understood and appropriately appreciated, the
following list suggests the semantic parameters of mandates:
“Order” group123:
ORDER:
A person who orders someone to do something wants the
addressee to do it and expects to cause him to do it via the speech
act. He presumes that the addressee has to do whatever the
speaker says he wants him to do, and that the addressee
understands this. He doesn’t appeal to the addressee’s feelings
or goodwill, but he does appeal to his understanding. Utterances
which are meant to trigger immediate and quasi-automatic
reactions tend to be reported as commands, rather than orders . .
. . If a response is expected to be delayed, order is more

Id. at 42 (stating that “[if] a requisite condition is absent, the utterance is said to be “invalid”
or “infelicitous.”).
122
See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Three Symmetries Between Textualist and Purposivist Theories
of Statutory Interpretation—and the Irreducible Roles of Values and Judgment Within Both, 99
CORNELL L. REV. 685, 688 n.11 (2014).
121

123
With regard to orders, Dr. Werzbicka explains the unspoken assumptions made by the
speaker in this way: “Whether we say ‘I order you to do it!’ or simply ‘Do it!’ (with the intonation
and demeanor characteristic of an order), we are expressing the following attitude: I want you to
do it[;] I assume that you have to do what I say I want you to do.” WIERZBICKA, supra note 79, at
16.
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appropriate. [thus, order is future-oriented, whereas command is
present-oriented].124
COMMAND:
Unlike orders, [commands] don’t appeal to the addressee’s
understanding. The most typical commands have the form of set
phrases (“Fire!”, “Sit!), which act upon the addressee as a
Pavlovian signal acts on a dog. Naturally, the speaker expects an
immediate response.
Commands are typically present oriented, because they expect
to trigger a semi-automatic response. . . .
....
. . .[Another difference is that] in the case of order, the action
doesn’t have to be performed by the addressee himself. For this
reason, one can say, for example, “The Prime Minister ordered
a survey/an investigation/a search,” and so on, but not “The
Prime Minister commanded a survey/an investigation/a search.”
In this respect, command behaves like tell and instruct, whereas
order behaves like request and demand.125
DIRECT:
Directing is similar to telling (to) in being, intuitively speaking,
somewhere between requesting and ordering/commanding: the
directing person wants the addressee to do something, and
expects to cause him to do it by his speech act; at the same time,
direct does not envisage any possible conflict of wills (as order
does) and it expects conscious cooperation rather than
automaton-like obedience, as command does. The directing
person expects that if the addressee knows what the speaker
wants him to do, he will be willing to do it. Thus, the speaker
expects compliance but not blind obedience. (In this respect,
direct is similar to instruct, as well as to tell.) 126
INSTRUCT:
The person who instructs [in the imperative sense] someone to
do something wants the addressee to do it and expects to cause
him to do it by the speech act. One can’t instruct one’s equals or
superiors to do something . . . . But the nature (or the

124
125
126

Id. at 38.
Id. at 39.
Id. at 43.
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interpretation) of the relationship is not as hierarchical in the
case of instruct as it is in the case of direct: a “director” assumes
that his subordinates have to do things that he directs them to do
(if these things are within the scope of their formal
relationship);127 but when somebody instructs his agent, lawyer
or personal assistant to do something, the expectation is that they
want to do whatever they are instructed to do—not because their
personal wishes coincide with the speaker’s wishes, but because
their subordination to the speaker is voluntary and constitutes an
aspect of a freely accepted professional or quasi-professional
relationship.128
REQUIRE:
In some ways, require can be said to be halfway between order
and request. The main difference between require and request
concerns the element of obligation. Request implies that the
addressee doesn’t have to do whatever is requested. For
example, printed invitation forms which say that somebody
“requests the pleasure” of somebody else’s company don’t
imply that the addressee has to attend. By contrast, if a Court
requires that somebody should attend a court session, the
implication is that the addressee has to do it. Presumably for this
reason, invitations couldn’t be phrased in terms of require, and
court summonses couldn’t be phrased in terms of request . . . .
Require is less personal than order in another way, too. What
the speaker wants is not so much another person’s action as a
certain state of affairs.129
Other verbs may, of course, be added to this list, and, in a certain context,
some of those listed might not amount to a mandate, even though their basic
semantic make-up would suggest that they do. Further, as will be seen, more
important than any of these verbs to the construction of a mandate may be the
use of a certain arrangement, or collocation of words, or the use of a particular
modal, which can take any verb—even one that does not belong to the taxonomy
just set forth—and give it the force of a directive.
Similarly useful in the task of distinguishing mandates from guidelines
is a taxonomy of words that Dr. Wierzbicka included in groups she nominated
“Ask” and “Advise.”130 As stated with regard to the “Order” words, these two
127
Id. at 45. Note how this statement relates to the preparatory condition. See discussion supra
Part III.A.1.iv. The formal relationship between the parties presupposes that the speaker has
authority to speak and that the hearer has the authority to follow the direction.
128
129
130

WIERZBICKA, supra note 79, at 45.
Id. at 47.
See id. at 181–90.
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groups are not meant to be exhaustive, and some would be unlikely candidates
for inclusion in a governmental utterance. However, they are listed below to
convey the kinds of semantic concepts that underpin guidelines. A selection is
set out below, along with Dr. Wierzbicka’s commentary.
“Ask” group:
ASK:
The asking person wants the addressee to do something that
would be to his (the speaker’s) benefit. He assumes that the
addressee can do it, but he doesn’t assume the addressee will do
it.131
REQUEST:
According to [C.J.] Smith [citations omitted], request “is a more
polite word for the same thing as ask”. “Nevertheless”, he goes
on to say, “it is sometimes used with an implied sense of
authority, amounting virtually to a command”. Studying the
differences in the usage of ask and request one comes to agree
with Smith’s judgment: request is more elaborately polite, and
yet more forceful than ask. Ask is direct, personal and informal;
request is formal, impersonal, markedly polite and yet selfassured . . . .
....
....
....
. . . Request doesn’t imply any superiority or inferiority either,
but it does imply a specific sort of relationship: formal, distant,
and impersonal.132
URGE:
Urging is an attempt to get the addressee to do something. To
that extent, it is similar to ask, request, order, command and
many other verbs. Unlike ask and request, however, it doesn’t
imply that the speaker is seeking a benefit for himself, and
unlike order and command, it doesn’t imply that the speaker has
power over the addressee.

131

Id. at 50

132

Id. at 50–52.
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. . . [T]he only kind of pressure he can exercise is
psychological.133
“Advise” Group:
ADVISE:
Advise has two different meanings, and two different sets of
syntactic frames . . . .
Advise1 can be performed by means of a bare imperative (“Hand
it this way, he advised”), and, like ask, invite, suggest and many
other speech act verbs, refers to a possible future action of the
addressee. The speaker thinks that he knows what the addressee
should do—and he says so, confident that it will be a good thing
if the addressee follows the proposed course of action . . . .
....
Like suggestions, advice does not have to be solicited.134
Advise2 is an official speech act, often performed (in writing) by
institutions addressing individuals. It is also characteristic of
lawyers, agents, and other professional people, who need to
convey information to their clients and other members of the
public, implying that they are acting in the addressee’s interest.
. . . [I]n the case of advise1, the speaker specifies what the
addressee should do. In the case of advise2 the addressee’s action
is not specified; what is specified is the information which is
expected to be followed by some sort of action on the part of the
addressee.135
RECOMMEND:
[I]n recommending, as in advising, the speaker thinks that he can
guide the addressee’s future actions in some way, and that the
addressee would welcome this. This means that in both cases the
speaker expresses his view concerning the addressee’s future
actions in response to the addressee’s actual or imagined
invitation for him to do so. . . .
....

133
134
135

Id. at 61–62.
Id. at 181–82.
Id. at 182–83.
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. . . [A]dvising aims at saying what the addressee should do,
whereas recommending seems to aim at saying what would be
good for the addressee.136
SUGGEST:
The person making a suggestion thinks that it might be a good
thing if the addressee did something. He invites, therefore, the
addressee to imagine himself actually doing it, so that he can
form an opinion about this possibility, and decide whether or not
he wants to follow it.137
PROPOSE:
The person who proposes something . . . envisages a collective
action, including both the speaker and the addressee. The
speaker himself is in favour of this collective action, but he
knows that he cannot cause it to take place unless the other
people involved also express themselves in its favour. What he
wants to achieve, therefore, is to make those other people
consider this action and to say whether they want it to happen.138
Dr. Wierzbicka makes a fundamental distinction between “ask” and
“order” in the following comment:
[T]he common part of order (“I order you to do it”) and ask (“I
ask you to do it”) can be represented in terms of the sentence “I
want you to do it”, and the additional semantic components of
order can be portrayed as “I assume that you will do it” and “I
assume that you have to do what I say I want you to do,” whereas
the additional semantic components of ask can be portrayed as
“I don’t know if you will do it” and “I assume that you don’t
have to do what I say I want you to do.”139
Finally another group has significance for mandate formation:
“Declare” Group:
DECLARE:

136

Id. at 185–86.

137

Id. at 186–87.
Id. at 188.

138
139

Id. at 11–12.

CONVERTDOC.INPUT.476722.GD9IS (DO NOT DELETE)

3/14/2016 4:44 PM

“SHOULD” OR “MUST”?

2016]

123

When the chairman of a meeting declares the meeting open he
does it not only ‘to cause people to know what they should
think’, but also to cause them to act accordingly. . . .
....
Declare . . . seems to create a new situation in the external world
. . . .140
PRONOUNCE:
Pronouncing involves saying something about a given entity,
doing it in an authoritative way, as if determining the correct
way for this entity to be viewed, and implying serious
consequences for this entity.141
RESOLVE:
Resolve . . . refers to a speech act which is not self-contained but
which culminates a certain process. Most other speech act verbs
can be analysed as bundles of simultaneous assumptions . . .
integrated into a single act. But resolve implies a past, as well as
a present. . . .
[With the background of a group wanting to do something about
a matter, discussing it, and coming to know what they want to
do], the speakers proceed to say what they want to do, assuming
that saying it will lead them to doing it. Their purpose consists
not in informing other people about the conclusion they have
reached, but simply in articulating it for themselves and in
committing themselves to a common goal . . . .142
Note that a governmental body may make a general statement—
aspirational in nature—that amounts to its taking up of a duty—a “resolution,”
as it were.143 But a resolution is a commissive, not a directive;144 it is a promise
to do something in general, but it does not say how it is to be done.145 That is
often how courts articulate a statement’s failure to meet the DFE, by holding that

140

Id. at 349.

141

Id. at 350.
Id. at 359. “Decree” is in this group as well, and is an institutional order or command. It
could be used in a mandate, but is so imperious that it is unlikely to be. See id. at 353–54. Other
words such as “proclaim” have the same cast to them. See id. at 352–53.
142

143
144
145

See infra Part IV.A.
See SEARLE, supra note 87, at 11–12.
See id.; see also supra Part III.A.1.i and note 91.
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the rule maker required that something be done, but did not elaborate on how it
should be done.146
In contrast, mandates must be clear and actionable.147 A resolution is a
philosophical position without a plan.148 Regardless of the plan, it must be
actuated—given arms and legs—by way of one or more mandates.149 Likewise,
decrees, proclamations, and pronouncements, however authoritatively spoken,
fall short of a mandate when they stay at the level of generalities.150 As shall be
seen, a great deal turns upon how much is said and in what way.151
Once more, the above taxonomies cannot be, and are not intended as, an
exhaustive vocabulary for either end of the spectrum—neither for mandates nor
for guidelines. However, since one of the felicity conditions (essential) of a
mandate is that it be recognizable as such,152 and the words used to form it
contribute in the most prominent way to the manifestation of that recognition,153
these taxonomies can provide some criteria for the determinations that courts
must make.
2. Implicature
Another major area in the field of pragmatics is the study of what
philosopher Paul Grice refers to as the “cooperation principle.”154 That is, for a
conversation to take place, the participants must cooperate with each other by
providing certain information to each other—in the amount, type, and manner
expected, as well as with the proper motivation.155 Grice termed the “maxims”
as follows:

146
147

See cases cited infra Part IV.C.3.
See supra Part III.A.1.v and note 123.

148

See WIERZBICKA, supra note 79, at 358–59.
See, e.g., Sutton v. Earles, 26 F.3d 903, 909 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that the regulation
provided that a designated officer would enforce it, but did not prescribe a specific course of action
of how that would be achieved. Therefore, the regulation lacked the mandatory nature and the
actions of the designated government officer fell within DFE).
150
See supra text accompanying notes 140–142.
149

151
152

See discussion infra Part IV.C.
See supra Part III.A.1.iv and note 115.

153

See discussion on Essential Conditions supra Parts III.A.1.ii and III.A.1.iv (stating what
kind of language must be used to satisfy essential condition).
154

H. P. Grice, Logic and Conversation, in 3 SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS: SPEECH ACTS 41, 45–
46 (Peter Cole & Jerry L. Morgan eds., 1975).
155

Id.
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Maxim of Quality: The conversant responds with true
information.156
Maxim of Quantity: The conversant responds with the amount
of informationno more and no lessthat is called for.157
Maxim of Relation: The conversant responds with relevant
information.158
Maxim of Manner: The conversant responds in a way that is
expected.159
But when a conversant intentionally replies in a way that breaks one of these
maxims, he is said to have “flouted” that maxim;160 this gives rise to an implied
meaning, or “implicature.”161 Again, I have used an example of implicature in an
earlier article that suffices here:
[A] client might ask his accountant whether he needs to report
certain cash income on his income tax return for the year, to
which the accountant could reply: “Do you want to get audited?”
Obviously, a layperson would suggest, the accountant is really
saying: “The law requires you to report that income.” But at the
level of language, a great deal takes place in order for that
meaning to be conveyed in the indirect way that it is.162 First, the
implicature “The law requires you to report that income” is not
part of the accountant’s utterance; by definition, the implication
is always unspoken. Second, the implicature is not “entailed.”
That is, the implicature does not follow as a matter of course
from the utterance. If the accountant had responded to the
client’s question: “You have to report that income on page two
of your return,” then the broader answer, “The law requires you
to report that income,” would be entailed within the answer
given. In the above exchange, by responding to the client’s
question with another question—”Do you want to get
audited?”—the accountant is said to “raise the implicature” that
the income must be reported.
....
156

Id. at 45–46.

157

Id.
Id. at 46.

158
159
160
161

Id.
Id. at 49.

Id. at 44.
Sarcasm, parody, and satire are all representative of the type of speech events that use
indirectness to achieve their desire effects.
162
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. . . By flouting the maxim of relation, the accountant in the
example above “raises the implicature” that taxes are owed. The
client unconsciously reasons as follows: To my question about
reporting cash income, Accountant did not answer yes or no, but
asked me a question about something other than reporting
income—i.e. whether I wanted to get audited, which of course I
don’t. I asked him about one thing and he told me about
something else. He intentionally did this, so I infer that if I don’t
report the income, I risk an audit.”163
All this makes the point that illocutionary acts can be made in indirect
ways and are no less explicit for that fact. Searle noted that indirect speech acts
are made when the syntactic form of the locution fits one classification, but
carries the illocutionary force of another.164 For example, if all of the felicity
conditions for a “mandate” are present,165 the illocutionary force of the directive
“Do it” can take the syntactic form of all of the others classes:
Representative: “Fail to do X and see what happens” or “You
must do X.”
Expressive: “I’m dead serious about X being done.”
Question: “Is there any conceivable excuse for not doing X?”
Declarative: “Anyone who doesn’t do X is fired.”
Note that the above utterances retain all of the semantic power of the directive.166
In the legal context—and particularly in the tort claims context—the degree to
which these statements are considered directives by the hearer would depend
upon the degree to which the felicity conditions are satisfied, but that is a
question for the trier of fact.167
163

Harmon, supra note 29, at 36–37.
See John R. Searle, Indirect Speech Acts, in 3 SYNTAX
71 (Peter Cole & Jerry L. Morgan eds., 1975).
165
See supra Part III.A.1.iv.
164

166

AND

SEMANTICS: SPEECH ACTS 59,

See supra text accompanying note 126 (defining direct); see also supra text accompanying
notes 134–139 (discussing “advise group). Also note that the taxonomy set forth in Part III can be
undone by flouting maxims: “I suggest you do it immediately,” said by a boss to a subordinate,
though it uses one of the most fundamental “guideline” words, is an indirect mandate taking the
form of a representative.
167
See, e.g., Navarette v. United States, 500 F.3d 914, 917–19 (9th Cir. 2007) (discussing the
specificity of the Army Corps Engineering Manual Safety Plan, and holding that it was specific
and did not allow for discretion). Using the felicity conditions, the trier of fact would determine
whether the Safety Plan was presented to the employees by the proper authority; whether the Safety
Plan was directed toward the proper parties; whether the Safety Plan was properly enforced;
whether the Safety Plan used language that denotes an imperative; whether the Safety Plan required
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It should also be noted that, unless a particular statute, regulation, or rule
forbids executive action taken in any way other than written form, there is
nothing to say that a governmental mandate cannot be made orally. 168 If a park
service director, speaking ex cathedra about matters within his purview, verbally
orders his staff to do X at a meeting, a mandate has been made if all of the felicity
conditions are met. This imperative could be made in any one of the abovereferenced indirect ways.169 Since indirect speech acts are perhaps more common
to conversation than to handbooks, the occurrence of an indirect directive is more
likely in the situational context of a meeting. But the orality of the
communication should not, for that very fact alone, disqualify it from
consideration as a mandate.
B. Syntax
Syntax is the branch of linguistics that deals with the construction of
language.170 Its contribution to the mandate/guideline analysis comes by way of
the fact that some word groupings, or “collocations,” evidence a mandate,171 and
by way of the fact that certain modalities can change the complexion of an
utterance, turning it from a fairly innocuous statement into a mandate.
1. Collocations
With regard to the collocation of the mandate, the order of the action
required, who requires it, and who will perform it, are optional:

action; whether the safety plan was sufficiently formal; whether the Safety Plan predicated that a
future course of action be taken. See supra Part III.A.1.iv.
168

See, e.g., Whisnant v. United States, 400 F.3d 1177, 1183 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that the
government could not exercise discretion in maintaining the safe conditions in the grocery store).
An oral order to clean the facility off of mold would be mandatory.
169
See supra Part III.A.2.
170

See M.B.W. Sinclair, Law and Language: The Role of Pragmatics in Statutory
Interpretation, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 373, 383 (1985) (“A speaker who violates the rules of English
syntax is, in a sense, not speaking English. Even more clearly, a speaker who attempts to use
English words with different meanings will fail to communicate with a conventional Englishspeaking hearer.”).
171
Dr.Wierzbicka makes the points about collocations:
The meaning of a word can often be illuminated by the other words which it
tends to co-occur with. For example, if we compare the adverbs which the
three related verbs, rebuke, reprimand and reprove, tend to co-occur with, we
will obtain important clues to the semantic differences between them. . . . Thus
rebuking tends to be done sharply whereas reprimanding tends to be done
severely; and neither rebuking nor reprimanding can be done gently. On the
other hand, reproving can be done gently, but cannot be done sharply; severely
is not excluded, but it is less likely to co-occur with reprove than with
reprimand.
WIERZBICKA, supra note 79, at 21.
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The Department requires the janitorial staff to mop the floors
weekly.
The floors will be mopped weekly by the janitorial staff as
required by the Department.
The janitorial staff, as required by the Department, will mop the
floors weekly
Further, a direct mandate may, but need not, be communicated in the
active voice, whereby the agent is shown:
The Agency requires that all employees. . .
A passive voice construction is also possible, suppressing the agent in
favor of highlighting the action:
All employees are required to. . .
Therefore, the “fronting” of the agent in the articulated mandate can be
implied. As long as the identity of the agent is clear, and as long as the agent has
the requisite power and authority, necessary for the preparatory condition of a
valid mandate,172 the expression or suppression of the agent’s name is optional.
After all, an employee handbook published by the Arizona Department of Safety
need not express every directive in terms of what “The Department” insists upon.
But there is less freedom to suppress the addressee in a mandate. The
identity of exactly who it is that must perform the action is a more important
matter. It may be implied, as in the case of an employee handbook given to all
employees, who understand that every directive inside the book applies to
everyone employed; it might even be clear from the context that the unstated
addressee is the concerned party—for example, a member of the janitorial staff
would gather that a directive stating that “All floors will be mopped once a week”
is directed at him; however, the further the locution strays from specificity—one
dimension of the essential condition—the more tenuous is the argument that it is
a mandate rather than a guideline.173
This indicates the preeminence of the essential condition in the speech
act analysis. Recognizability is most compromised when the predication—the
“verbness”—of the utterance, is attenuated. Who wants the action done and who
will do the action are more or less required for a mandate’s validity, depending

172

See supra text accompanying notes 115–116.
See, e.g., Miller v. United States, 163 F.3d 591, 594–95 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that the
guidelines in question were not mandatory “because they [did] not tell firefighters how to fight the
fire,” and because the guidelines did not address in more specificity what to do in multiple fire
situation).
173
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on the context,174 but what must be done is indispensable, regardless of
context.175
2. Modals
Modals are the aspects of language that allow the speaker to attach
expressions of obligation, belief, or attitude to an utterance.176 In English, these
modes are often expressed through a small range of verbs: “can,” “could,”
“may,” “might,” “shall,” “should,” “will,” “would,” and “ought.”177 Such
expressions can also be made lexically (i.e., through phrases, such as “if at all
possible, X will . . .” or “without exception, the use of Y is called for when . . . .”)
With regard to the speech act analysis conducted here, the importance of the
modals lies in whether they create an obligation to act in the fashion prescribed
by the main verb, or on the other hand, express something less than that.
The use of “can” and “could”178 denotes only the ability to do the act or
the possibility of its occurrence, not an obligation to do it:
The Committee can recommend the dissolution of the study in
the event that . . . .
A snowstorm can precipitate the closure of the park by the staff.
The use of “may” and “might” denote only the discretion to do the act,
not an obligation to do it:

174

See supra Part III.B.1.

175

The importance of the object, depending upon the intended meaning, is explained this way:
[I]f a verb implies that the agent wants to achieve a certain state of affairs and
that the role of the addressee is rather instrumental, then it is the desired state
of affairs, rather than the addressee, which is treated as a direct object. Hence
for example the following contrasts:
he demanded the release of the prisoners
*he asked the release of the prisoners
he asked them to release the prisoners
*he demanded them to release the prisoners[.]
WIERZBICKA, supra note 79, at 25.
176
See
Modal
Verbs
and
Their
Meaning,
MY
ENGLISH
PAGES,
http://www.myenglishpages.com/site_php_files/grammar-lesson-modals.php#.VIXSn_2IzlJ (last
visited Feb. 27, 2016) (discussing modal verbs and stating that “[t]hey have a great variety of
communicative functions”).
177

Id.
It is unlikely that “could” or “might” would appear in the form of a governmental
pronouncement, but they are conceivable: “The staff could agree that no action is necessary
when . . . ”; “The agency might look to the data compiled by X when deciding whether . . . .”
“Ought” is also a possibility, but would again denote mere aspiration.
178
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The Committee may recommend the dissolution of the study in
the event that . . . .
The use of “should” can be used either way,179 to denote obligation (and
is synonymous with “shall” in such cases) or to imply suggestion. Although
typically “should” is used in the form of a recommendation, the context of the
surrounding words can supply a different meaning180:
The Board of Directors should meet four times a year in the
main office of the corporation as opposed to Employees should
make their best efforts to create a welcoming atmosphere for
customers.
The use of “shall” and “will” denote compulsion to do the act, if other
indicators do not contradict them in some way or attenuate the order:
The Committee shall/will meet four times a year.
The use of “would” in a purported mandate has an attenuating function,
just as in the case of “can,” “could,” “may,” and “might.”181 As in the unlikely
use of “could” or “might,” the use of “would” weakens the sense of obligation
so much that it becomes more of a guideline, politely stated: The Agency would
like to have all reports by the first of the month. Note that the type of verbs bound

179

The dual, sometimes contradictory, nature of words was analyzed by Sigmund Freud. He
called these terms “primal words.” See Sigmund Freud, The Antithetical Meaning of Primal Words,
in WRITINGS ON ART AND LITERATURE (1997). Ethicist P.H. Nowell-Smith called such terms
“Janus” words, since they looked in both directions. See P.H. NOWELL-SMITH, ETHICS 100, 223
(1954).
180
An example, in which the court seems to interpret “should” in the sense of “shall,” appears
in a Southern District of Florida case, in which a diplomatic “Letter of Instruction,” stated than an
ambassador “should instruct all Executive branch personnel under [the Ambassador’s] authority
of their responsibility to keep [the Ambassador] fully informed at all times of their current and
planned activities . . . .” Couzado v. United States, 883 F. Supp. 691, 694–95 (S.D. Fla. 1995)
(emphasis added), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom., 105 F.3d 1389 (11th Cir. 1997). The court
construed the modal “should” in context with the other semantic words belonging to the “Order”
semantic group, such as “require.” Id.; see also Garcia v. United States, 709 F. Supp. 2d 1133,
1148–49 (D.N.M. 2010) (discussing the dual nature of “should”).
181
Dr. Wierzbicka states that:

[s]peech act verbs differ also from one another in the range of modals which
they can occur with. For example, one can make suggestions of
recommendations using the frames “I would suggest . . .” and “I would
recommend . . .” But one cannot order, confess or inform using the frames “I
would order you. . .” “I would confess . . .” or “I would inform you”. On the
other hand, one can confess or inform—but not suggest or recommend—using
the modal must (“I must confess . . .”, “I must inform you . . .”, “I must suggest
. . .”, “I must recommend . . .”).
WIERZBICKA, supra note 79, at 22.
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with “would” are in the “Ask” group of speech acts,182 or are not speech act verbs
at all: “I would ask that you . . . I would like for you to . . . .” However, a rather
formal but nevertheless valid mandate could be formed using “would” in the
following way: The Agency would require that all employees . . . , emphasizing
the will of the Agency in an admittedly complicated fashion; still, the directive
is plain.183
The importance of modals to the formation of mandates underscores the
point made above with regard to collocations: mandates affect recognizability,184
and since recognizability relates to the essential condition of a felicitous
mandate,185 its preeminence is doubly clear.
In summary, pragmatics and syntax play a key role in the understanding
of what mandates and guidelines are at the level of language. Both the situational
context regarding the utterance as well as its basic construction are the means by
which hearers interpret a particular statement as a mandate or not. Viewed
through this linguistic lens, an appreciation of the variables that contribute to the
mandatory nature of a particular utterance is more acute.
IV. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF TORT CLAIMS ACTS: FEDERAL AND STATE
Turning to what courts have done when analyzing the question of
whether a statement is a mandate or a guideline, the best articulation of what is
at stake was made by the United States Supreme Court in Berkovitz v. United
States.186 The pronouncement applies to the federal context, but is also applicable
to state tort claims acts.
As described in Berkovitz, to show that a statement is a guideline rather
than a mandate, the government must first prove that “the action is a matter of
choice for the acting employee.”187 Because “conduct cannot be discretionary
unless it involves an element of judgment or choice,” a government employee’s
action is not discretionary if “a federal statute, regulation, or policy specifically

182

For a discussion the “Ask” group of speech acts, see supra Part III.A.1.v.

183

Dr. Wierzbicka makes the following distinction:

[t]he difference between “I would suggest” and “I would order you . . .” is
easily explained in terms of meaning, because of the inherent tentativeness of
suggesting, and forcefulness of ordering. It also seems clear why one doesn’t
introduce suggestions in the frame “I must suggest . . .”, again because of the
tentativeness of suggesting. But then, why can’t orders and commands be
introduced in the frames “I must order you” or “I must command . . .”?
WIERZBICKA, supra note 79, at 22–23.
184
See supra Part III.B.1 and note 170.
185
186
187

See supra Parts III.A.1.iii–III.A.1.iv.
See 486 U.S. 531, 536 (1988).
Id.
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prescribes a course of action for an employee to follow.”188 Accordingly, the
DFE exception “does not protect the government when it elects not to perform a
duty that a statute or regulation requires it to perform.” 189 Therefore, the first
level of inquiry is whether there is a codified statute or regulation that speaks to
the matter in this way.190 If so, there is no option in the matter, and failure to
comply with the statute will result in liability for a resulting injury.191
However, there is an important distinction between regulations that
direct certain behavior, permitting discretion in achieving that behavior, and
regulations that direct a specific course of action to achieve a specific result. 192
As the Court explained in Berkovitz, an action protected by the DFE must
actually be discretionary—or, alternatively, cannot be a mandatory action
prescribed by statute, regulation, or other policy.193
The determination of whether a mandatory directive exists must depend
on “established governmental policy, as express or implied by statute, regulation,
or agency guidelines.”194 In these pronouncements lies the formal iteration of the
rule that permits the waiver of liability as per the particular tort claims act—and
makes inapplicable a DFE thereby— when the statement involves a mandate.195
The plaintiff can proceed to his proof because the matter is one relating to
whether the defendant breached his duty to perform the directed action.196
On the other hand, if the statement does not involve a mandate, then the
second prong of the DFE must be examined (i.e., whether the matter involved
was policy related).197 Guidelines are perforce discretionary matters, and a
government defendant who has won the first battle—determining the nature of
the statement to be precatory not mandatory—creates a presumption that the

188

Id. For example, California requires by statute that its hospitals screen for Methicillinresistant staphyllococous aureus (staph infection) in all intensive care units, burn units, dialysis
patients, and patients transferred in from a skilled nursing facility. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 1255.8 (West 2012). Failure to follow such a rule would result in a waiver of government liability
under the state’s tort claims act, CAL. CONST. art. III, § 5, without argument over the applicability
of its discretionary function exception. CAL. GOV’T CODE §820.2 (West 2012).
189
190

Sutton v. Earles, 26 F.3d 903, 2011 (9th Cir 1994) (citing Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536).
Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536.

191

See id.
See Sutton, 26 F.3d at 908–09 (noting that, while the regulations in question imposed
specific duties on boat operators, they did not specifically mandate any action by the government
entity tasked with enforcing those regulations).
192

193

486 U.S. at 536.
Terbush v. United States, 516 F.3d 1125, 1130 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing United States v.
Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 316 (1991)).
195
See id. at 1131 (citing Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536).
194

196

See Sutton, 26 F.3d. at 908.
See Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 537 (“The exception, properly construed, therefore protects only
governmental actions and decisions based on considerations of public policy.”).
197
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matter also involved policy.198 To reiterate, the stakes of winning the first prong
of a DFE are therefore quite high, in that the plaintiff can go immediately to proof
of injury if the statement is a mandate—always a good position from a tort
perspective.199 On the other hand, the defendant can proceed to claim essential
matters of policy when the statement is determined to be merely a guideline,
suggestive in nature only (and by implication, open to interpretation as to how
the suggestion should be accomplished).200
In the following pages, the analysis categorizes various cases, both
federal and state, in terms of the felicity conditions for mandates set out above.
In other words, the holdings in these opinions are based on principles that
comport with the felicity conditions, in that the particular governmental
statement (1) was or was not from the right party or to the right party (Preparatory
Condition); (2) was or was not in the proper form, was or was not specific
enough, or does or does not use mandatory language (Essential Condition); or
(3) was or was not enforced or treated as a mandate by the parties in question
(Perlocutionary Effect refuting Sincerity Condition).201 All of the conditions
must be met, but as shall be seen, the vast majority of cases in the area turn upon
matters relating to the essential condition—the recognizability of the mandate.202
As such, cases involving the matters related to the preparatory and sincerity
conditions will be dealt with first.
A. Preparatory Condition: The Speaker and the Audience
As set forth above, the speech act preparatory condition for a valid
mandate would concern things that are pre-utterance, namely, that the parties
involved must be relevant to the act. A mandate can only be spoken by a party
with the authority to give it, and can only be addressed to one in a place to act
upon it.203 Cases involving this component of mandate/guideline analysis include
a seminal opinion in the area handed down by the Supreme Court, as well as an
important pronouncement made by the First Circuit.204

198

Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 324.
See Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536 (“[T]he discretionary function exception will not apply when
a federal statute, regulation, or policy specifically prescribes a course of action for an employee to
follow.”).
199

200

See Sutton, 26 F.3d at 909–10 (holding that the government could exercise the discretion
when deciding whether to enforce “the various provisions of the system of boater control” provided
in the regulations. Therefore, the court could move on to the next prong to determine whether the
decision not to post the warning sign was grounded in policy.).
201

See supra Part III.A.1.iv. The propositional content condition is not in question in these

cases.
202
203
204

See discussion infra Part IV.C.
See supra Part III.A.1.iv.
See cases cited infra notes 205, 214.

.input.476722.Gd9is (DO NOT DELETE)

CONVERTDOC

134

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

3/14/2016 4:44 PM

[Vol. 118

In a significant declaration, the Supreme Court stated in United States v.
Gaubert that whether an action is mandatory or discretionary depends upon “the
nature of the conduct, rather than the status of the actor.”205 Consequently,
discretionary action is not confined to individuals in management positions.206
The day-to-day management of a business requires discretionary action to the
same extent as “policymaking or planning functions”; so the distinction between
actions at the managerial level and actions at the operational level was held to be
invalid for the purposes of determining the nature of the action as mandatory or
discretionary.207
However, the Court’s statement in Gaubert is more nuanced than it
might first appear.208 While it is true that the act of exercising discretion—the
balancing and weighing that makes something a matter of judgment—is
something that can be done on the day-to-day, operational level just as much as
at the management stage, such an acknowledgement is not somehow a judicial
refutation of the preparatory condition.209 Rather, the point the Court makes
relates to the performance of the discretion;210 it is not a pronouncement on who
can make the rule. Anyone at any level may be required to exercise discretion,
but only the proper party can make the rule.211 As such, the preparatory condition
is observed.212
The courts’ understanding of this point is highlighted in a 1998 First
Circuit opinion, in which the plaintiff claimed that the testimony as to the
mandatoriness of a rule should be allotted significant weight in determining the
issue.213 The court’s assessment is clear:
The most obvious reason why such sources command less
weight is because it matters who speaks. To determine what is
agency policy, courts customarily defer to the statements of the
official policymaker, not others, even though the others may
occupy important agency positions. This case is a suitable
vehicle for application of the principle. Congress has the legal
authority to render a function either discretionary or obligatory,
and it has delegated that power to the Secretary, not to OSHA’s
205
United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 325 (1991) (citing United States v. S.A. Empresa
de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797, 813 (1984)).
206
207
208
209
210
211

Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 325.
See id. (citing Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 813).
See Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 813–14.

212

See supra Part III.A.1.iv (defining the preparatory condition as one requiring that the
mandate be spoken by the proper party and directed at the proper party).
213

See Irving v. United States, 162 F.3d 154, 164 (1st Cir. 1998).

CONVERTDOC.INPUT.476722.GD9IS (DO NOT DELETE)

3/14/2016 4:44 PM

“SHOULD” OR “MUST”?

2016]

135

area directors or compliance officers. Hence, we decline to
accord decretory significance to the area director’s or
compliance officers’ thoughts on OSHA policy requirements,
especially when the plaintiff insists on interpreting this
testimony in a manner contrary to both the express statements of
Congress and the agency’s institutional pronouncements.214
As the court says, “it matters who speaks.”215 While testimony as to interpretation
and usage are relevant, which the court acknowledges, they do not trump an
express iteration of a rule or pose a challenge to the authority of the rule maker.216
It is never the case that a valid mandate can be made by one without the proper
authority; nor can the converse be true: that a mandate communicated to the
wrong party (i.e., one who does not have the power to carry it out) is valid.217 In
other words, the proper audience is as important as the proper speaker.
An illustration of this point can be found in Couzado v. United States.218
In Couzado, the United States government conducted a covert sting operation
through the controlled delivery of a cocaine shipment. Neither the flight crew,
the passengers, nor the customs agents or Ambassador in Belize, where the flight
made a stopover, were informed of the operation.219 The cocaine was discovered
in Belize, and the crew members and passengers spent eleven days in jail; they
sued the government as a result.220The Southern District of Florida made a point
that the Ambassador’s staff were all aware of notification requirements in an
express policy; the court held that the non-observance of that policy breached a
mandate.221
This point resonates with those pertaining to the sincerity condition, the
requirement that for a valid mandate, the utterance must be made in earnest.

214
Irving, 162 F.3d at 166 (citations omitted). The Irving court cited Martin v. Occupational
Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 144 (1991), which held that “where . . . the
relevant regulations are ambiguous, a reviewing court must defer to the Commission’s reasonable
interpretation rather than the Secretary’s interpretation,” reasoning that “Congress intended to
delegate to the Commission the normal complement of adjudicative powers possessed by
traditional administrative agencies, including the power to ‘“declare” the law’; and Dir., Office of
Workers’ Comp. Programs, U.S. Dep’t of Labor v. E. Associated Coal Corp., 54 F.3d 141, 147 (3d
Cir. 1995), which held that the courts will “give judicial deference to the Director, as policymaker,
rather than to the Board, which is purely an adjudicator.”
215
Irving, 162 F.3d at 166.
216
217

Id.
See id.; see also supra Part III.A.1.iv.

218
Couzado v. United States, 883 F. Supp. 691, (S.D. Fla. 1995), aff’d in part, rev’d in part
sub nom., 105 F.3d 1389 (11th Cir. 1997).
219
220
221

Id.
Id. at 692–93.
Id. at 694.
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B. Sincerity Condition: Custom and Usage
As stated above, the sincerity condition for a mandate relates to the
earnestness with which the utterance is made.222 The sincerity of the expression
is important in that it can be challenged by proof of contrary action. Again, as
stated above, the sincerity of an utterance can be challenged, and the felicitous
quality of the act compromised, by evidence that the act did not have the requisite
perlocutionary effect. That is, evidence that the mandate was not treated as a
mandate by the parties would go some ways towards refuting the argument that
it was, in fact, a mandate.223
This point can be restated by means of another semantic feature of verbs,
the nature of which reveals, but does not confirm, a particular mental or
emotional state. Some verbs are “stative” in nature, as opposed to “dynamic,”224
in that through their expression the speaker is revealing a state of being rather
than denoting an action.225 John fixes cars¸ expresses a state in the world that
John enjoys—that of car repairman—whereas John fixes cars Monday through
Friday expresses the dynamic action of actually fixing cars.226
Further, a particular type of stative verb, sometimes called “mental
verbs,”227 reveal something about the mental (strictly speaking) or emotional
(more broadly speaking) state of the speaker.228 I know he’s the best man for the
job expresses the speaker’s professed belief. I believe there’s hope for him
professes a confidence in the object. But in neither of these last two cases can the
hearer objectively confirm what the speaker actually “knows” or “believes.” 229
The veracity of the statement is known only to the speaker (even then, he might
be delusional). Any refutation of such a statement would have to come by way
of circumstantial evidence as to the speaker’s true knowledge and true belief.230
In much the same way, the effect of a particular utterance—how it is
treated by both the speaker and the audience—can be evidence as to whether it
was sincerely meant as a mandate, or was rather taken as merely a guideline.
222

See supra text accompanying notes 117–118.

223

See supra Parts III.A.1.iii–III.A.1.iv.
ROBERT I. BINNICK , TIME AND THE VERB: A GUIDE TO TENSE AND ASPECT 183–84 (1991).

224
225
226

Id. at 183.
See id. at 183–84.

227
See generally Carl Nils Johnson & Michael P. Maratsos, Early Comprehension of Mental
Verbs: Think and Know, 48 CHILD DEV. 1743 (1977) (discussing the children’s understanding of
the mental verbs “know” and “think”).
228
See generally id.
229
See id. at 1744–47 (discussing the results of the experiment with the four and three yearolds who knew where the hidden object was located, and who thought that they knew where it was
located).
230
See id. (discussing the responses of the children when asked why they thought the hidden
object was under the Box B rather than under the Box A and vice versa).
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“Custom and usage” has always been a means by which ambiguities can
be resolved, even if it is not the first line of inquiry.231 As the California appellate
court put it: “[R]equisite standards of certainty can [often] be fleshed out from
otherwise vague statutory language by reference to any of the following sources:
(1) long established or commonly accepted usage; (2) usage at common law; (3)
judicial interpretations of the statutory language or of similar language;
(4)legislative history or purpose.”232
A representative case, in which matters that pertain to the sincerity
condition of a mandate, is discussed in the First Circuit opinion, Kelly v. United
States.233 There the court identifies the proper inquiry, then proceeds to analyze
the customary treatment of the rule in question as evidence relevant to a
determination of its nature:
We recently wrote that, in regard to the first part of the
discretionary function test, “the proper inquiry must center on
the amount of discretion actually held and exercised by the
government employees whose actions or omissions are at issue.”
Here, the record reveals without contradiction that (1) DEA
officials consistently regarded regional managers as possessing
discretion in handling unsubstantiated rumors, and (2) such
discretion was actually and consistently exercised at the regional
level. Kelly, a veteran agent, could have contested this
interpretation of the regulations by evidence of contrary
practice, but offered none. Instead, he relied solely on the letter
of the regulations—language which, while perhaps suggestive,
was at the very least a mixed bag, interweaving imperatives with
weaker, precatory verbs and generalities more characteristic of
discretion than of mandatory directives. Standing alone, this
was not enough.234
Note that the court focuses upon the way the rule was “regarded” by the audience,
and upon the way the discretion was “actually and consistently” exercised.235
Both the perception of the audience as to the discretionary nature of the utterance

231
See Carey Canada, Inc. v. Columbia Cas. Co., 940 F.2d 1548, 1556–58 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
(resolving contractual ambiguities by looking to custom and usage). But see 12 SAMUEL WILLISTON
& RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 34:7 (4th ed. 2012) (rejecting resort
to custom and usage when contract is unambiguous).
232
People v. Nguyen, 207 Cal. Rptr. 870, 873 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (emphasis added)
(quoting Sechrist v. Mun. Court, 134 Cal. Rptr. 733, 737 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976)).
233
See Kelly v. United States, 924 F.2d 355, 360–62 (1st Cir. 1991).
234

Id. at 360 (emphasis added) (citing Irving v. United States, 909 F.2d 598, 602 (1st Cir.
1990)).
235

Id.
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in question, and the real and persistent treatment of the utterance, are key in
deciding that the utterance was a guideline, not a mandate.236
Further, the court states that this evidence could have been rebutted by
“evidence of contrary practice, but [the plaintiff] offered none.”237 The rationale
is clear: how the statement is treated—its reception and enforcement—is
evidence of its nature.238 In fact, the court privileges this evidence over evidence
as to the language itself, at least in a case in which there is a mixture of
“imperatives with weaker, precatory verbs and generalities.”239 Thus, the court
takes the perlocutionary effect of the statement as evidence of its
sincerity/intention.240
In Garcia v. United States, the district court of New Mexico stated that
it would consult testimony of the parties as to the meaning of the modal “should”
in a police department’s standard operating procedures:
Section 2–03–3, which states circumstances under which an offduty officer “should not” engage in certain conduct, might be
construed more strictly in practice than the language suggests.
Some might consider the word “should” to be permissive,
granting discretion, while others might consider it to exhibit a
mandatory obligation. . . . The Court believes that testimony of
the witnesses in the upcoming trial will aid the Court in
determining the meaning of the Isleta SOPs § 2–03–2.241
In this case, the interpretation by way of custom and usage would inform how
the statement was understood—”intended”—or in other words, “sincerely
meant.”242 Note that the evidence produced by the sincerity condition, as
illustrated in such instances, relates to interpretation of purpose, and not
necessarily to veracity.243 Again, evidence of how the speaker means the
statement to be taken, and how the audience understands it to be taken, is all that
can be offered to determine purpose. To hold that there is no evidence that the

236

See id.; see also supra Part III.A.1.iii.

237

Kelly, 924 F.2d at 360.
See id.

238
239
240

Id.
See id.; see also supra Part III.A.1.iii.

241

Garcia v. United States, 709 F. Supp. 2d 1133, 1148–49 (D.N.M. 2010). The court went on
to quote Kelly v. United States as to the importance of the amount of discretion “actually held and
exercised.” Kelly, 924 F.2d at 360.
242
See Garcia, 709 F. Supp. 2d at 1148–49; see also supra Part IV.B.
243

See Garcia, 709 F. Supp. 2d at 1148–49.
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speaker meant the statement to be taken as he claims is not to charge him with a
falsehood, but only to say that he cannot substantiate his claim.244
Although this type of evidence is granted a degree of deference, courts
have also insisted that it give place to other evidence when it exists. In Irving,
the court made a statement relating both to circumstantial, “anecdotal” evidence
of usage (that which is relevant to the sincerity condition inquiry) as well as to
evidence that came by way of more formal pronouncements (form being an
aspect of the essential condition):
Although we do not suggest that those items invariably will be
the exclusive sources for determining established policy, it bears
remembering that the Court’s recognition that informal rules
may be a relevant source took place against a background
understanding, both in administrative law generally and in the
OSHA context specifically, that agencies typically make
authoritative informal statements of policy positions through
published interpretive rules or enforcement guidelines.
Although anecdotal testimony sometimes may furnish clues
regarding the nature of agency policy, it is usually a last-ditch
resort.245
The court went on to say that even the plaintiff’s “anecdotal” evidence of usage
was suspect when offered as proof of the mandatoriness of the statement.246 The
evidence the plaintiff used in support of its argument was the following
testimony, consisting of an exchange between plaintiff’s counsel and the OSHA
Area Director:
Q. And, by the way, the obligation and procedure of your
department is to note and cite specific violations, is it not?
A. To note—document and—identify and document specific
hazards, yes.
Q. Machine by machine by machine?
A. As far as we can see.
Q. Hazard by hazard by hazard?
A. As can be observed.247
The court stated that nowhere in this testimony is there indication of a
policy to inspect every machine.248 In other words, any machine inspected had to

244
See Heinrich ex rel. Heinrich v. Sweet, 62 F. Supp. 2d 282, 324–25 (D. Mass. 1999) (using
correspondence between agency member to interpret a piece of legislation that “interweave[ed]
precatory with quasi-mandatory language”).
245
Irving v. United States, 162 F.3d 154, 166 (1st Cir. 1998) (citations omitted).
246
247
248

Id.
Id.
Id. at 167.
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be thoroughly inspected, but not every machine had to be inspected.249 The court
said this indicated a discretionary guideline, not a mandate: “[a]t the very least,
there must be an indication in the record that the witness demonstrated his
awareness of the agency’s formal policy statements, but nevertheless had some
other articulable basis that supported his understanding of agency
policy.”250Here, the court implies that had there been articulable evidence of an
understanding contrary to the formal statement, it would have been considered.251
The weight given to the circumstantial evidence is, as always, subject to its
credibility.252
The “custom and usage” argument finds an analogy in basic estoppel
arguments, such as the “government knowledge inference” defense in false
claims actions.253 In that area, evidence that the government knew of and
acquiesced in the payment of claims submitted by the defendant is an answer to
a charge that the defendant submitted a false claim. In short, the government
cannot have led the defendant into a belief that its claims were valid, then turn
around and charge the defendant with fraud for making the claims.254
Of course, the efficacy of such a defense turns upon how much the
government knew, from which sources, the cooperativeness of the defendant in
the process, the timing of the events, etc.,255 but that is the case with any claim
of estoppel.256 In the DFE context, a defendant claiming that an alleged mandate
was never enforced, or better yet, was deliberately made superfluous, would
mount a more persuasive argument against its mandatory nature than if events
proved otherwise.257 In light of the Irving court’s pronouncement, such
arguments would have a difficult time standing up against a clearly written
specific mandate made by the proper party.258

249

Id.

250

Id.
See id.

251

252
See id. at 166–67 (stating that circumstantial evidence may be given weight in some
instances).
253
254

See JOHN T. BOESE, CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS AND QUI TAM ACTIONS § 2.06 (4th ed. 2014).
See United States ex rel. Burlbaw v. Orenduff, 548 F.3d 931, 957 (10th Cir. 2008).

255

See id. at 951–54.
See, e.g., John W. Lundquist, “They Knew What We Were Doing”: The Evolution of the
Criminal Estoppel Defense, 23 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 843, 855–61 (1997) (discussing the
government’s knowledge requirement when the defendant invokes the defense of criminal
estoppel).
257
See, e.g., Begay v. United States, 768 F.2d 1059, 1064 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that it was
not a mandate for the inspectors to implement safety regulations because they could choose to
either do so or not).
256

258
See supra p. 138–39. The Irving Court went on to say: “Where, as here, the statute and the
applicable regulations clearly speak to the nature of the conduct, there is no occasion to consult
informal rules.” Irving v. United States, 162 F.3d 154, 165 (1st Cir. 1998); see also Kelly v. United
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C. Essential Condition: Form, Language, Specificity
By far, the condition by which the mandate/guideline determination is
judged most is the essential condition—those things that make the mandate
recognizable as a mandate. The aspects of this condition relate to the form that
the mandate takes, the words with which it is communicated, and the degree of
detail into which it goes in that conveyance.
1. Form
When speaking of “form,” the question revolves around the method or
means by which the alleged rule has been communicated.259 Obviously, a more
“formal” expression would be one that indicates the gravity of the utterance and
the seriousness with which it is intended.260 In this way, form is also somewhat
indicative of the sincerity condition.261 After all, an unmistakable communiqué
from on high is not only understood to be what it is, but is understood to be the
earnest desire of the communicator. Note also that a communication can obtain
a good part of its formality by means of the person making it, which resonates
with the preparatory condition.262 The head of an agency who makes a
pronouncement lends a degree of solemnity to even a spoken communication
that a lesser functionary cannot.263 All this is to say that a particular fact can
contribute to more than one felicity condition.
Evidence that the courts have picked up on this aspect of the
mandate/guideline determination is exemplified in a number of cases. For
example, in Tam v. United States,264 as evidence that the Forestry Service was
negligent in managing an ice cave recreational area, the plaintiff offered a set of

States, 924 F.2d. 355, 360 (1st Cir. 1991) (stating that “[a] regulation which straightforwardly
strips all discretion might well be beyond the reach of 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a), even if ignored in
practice”).
259
See, e.g., Camozzi v. Rolald/Miller and Hope Consulting Grp., 866 F.2d 287, 290 (9th Cir.
1989) (holding that “a failure to effectuate policy choices already made and incorporated in the
contracts” did not involve discretion). In the given case the mandate took the form of a contract.
See id.
260
See Irving, 162 F.3d at 165–66 (holding that there is no need to consult informal rules when
formal rules are available, and that the informal rules are the last resort in determining the nature
of the conduct).
261

See supra Parts III.A.1.iv, IV.B (explaining sincerity condition).
See, e.g., Irving, 162 F.3d at 166 (stating that “it matters who speaks”); see also supra Parts
III.A.1.iv, IV.A (explaining preparatory condition).
263
See Irving, 162 F.3d at 166 (“To determine what is agency policy, courts customarily defer
to the statements of the official policymaker, not others, even though the others may occupy
important agency positions.”).
262

264

905 F. Supp. 2d 1221 (W.D. Wash. 2012).
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what the district court nominated “planning or policy documents.”265 The court
not only held that the language in the documents was discretionary in nature, but
also that “[the] documents do not rise to the level of specific mandates directing
a course of action under step one of the discretionary function exception. Both
the [documents] are recommendations by a planning committee, not required
mandates.”266 The fact that the alleged rules were made by a “planning
committee” also took them afoul of the preparatory condition, in that they were
not made by an authoritative body.267
In a similar vein, the Ninth Circuit in Bibeau v. Pacific Northwest
Research Foundation, Inc.268 reviewed a group of letters exchanged between
individuals employed by the Atomic Energy Commission and the Division of
Biology and Medicine discussing medical and safety issues concerning
biological experiments conducted on inmates.269 The court held that “sporadic
communications, made by individuals of varying levels of importance to the
operation of the experiments, cannot constitute a blanket regulation constraining
the Government’s operations.”270 Here, not only was the form too casual, but the
sporadic means by which it was sent indicated that the utterance was merely
suggestive, not mandatory, in nature.271
The reasoning in a First Circuit case resonates with both the preparatory
condition and the essential condition. In Irving v. United States, a case in which
the lower court looked only at formal pronouncements by an agency to determine
mandatoriness, the appellate court acknowledged that though more casual, oral
pronouncements can prove to be mandates, they are not at the foremost in the list
of considerations.272 The implication is that all things being equal, the more
formal the expression, the more apt the courts are to find a mandate.273 This
disposition accounts for a finding by the Ninth Circuit that a procedural
handbook, which contained a statement that “all complaints of alleged hazards
. . . must be evaluated,” issued by the Mine Safety and Health Administration,
included mandates, not mere guidelines.274 The formality of the official

265

Id. at 1232–33.

266

Id. at 1233.
Id.

267
268
269
270
271
272

339 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 945.
Id. at 945–46.
Id.; see supra Part III.A.1.iv (explaining essential condition).

Irving v. United States, 162 F.3d 154, 166 (1st Cir. 1998).
See Bibeau, 339 F.3d at 945–46; Heinrich v. Sweet, 308 F.3d 48, 59 (1st Cir. 2002); Irving,
162 F.3d at 166.
274
Olson v. United States, 362 F.3d 1236, 1239–40 (9th Cir. 2004), vacated, 546 U.S. 43
(2005), remanded to 433 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2006).
273
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handbook in which the pronouncement appeared influenced the court’s
determination of the pronouncement’s nature.
The district court of Massachusetts, in Burnashov v. F/V Oceanview,
Inc.,275 also rejected the argument that information in a certain kind of document
could amount to a directive:
The documents cited by Oceanview, such as the nautical charts
and DOD Manual, are not mandatory directives. “Because a
mariner cannot reasonably rely solely on a chart, nautical charts
do not induce reliance such that the government has a duty to
ensure their accuracy, especially where the government
specifically directs mariners to other publications through
warnings or cautions on the chart itself.”276
In other words, the kind of information in this type of document could not be a
directive by itself, as the conduct under question relied on consulting other
publications.277
It is seldom that the courts hold on the grounds of form alone, which is
perhaps a function of the fact that the means of communication are often
accompanied by other aspects of the essential condition.278 One of those aspects
relates to language. The nature of the very wording used has proven a large part
of judicial analysis.
2. Language
Judging by the number of times courts have based their holding upon it,
a determinative factor in the mandate/guideline analysis is the type of language
that the purported rule includes.279 The verbs in the taxonomy set out in Part III
above, along with the modals discussed in that same part, figure prominently in
the court’s assessment of the issue here.
Often, the clarity of a mandate turns upon the use of either an “Order”
or “Ask” verb.280 In these cases, the evidence yielded by a “plain reading” of the
rule’s text leads to the determination.281 In Faber v. United States, the Ninth

275
276
277
278

978 F. Supp. 2d 77 (D. Mass. 2013).
Id. at 82–83 (citing Limar Shipping Ltd. v. United States, 324 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2003)).
See id.
See cases cited infra notes 275–276.

279
See, e.g., Autery v. United States, 992 F.2d 1523, 1525 (11th Cir. 1993); Franklin Sav. Corp.
v. United States, 970 F. Supp. 855, 866 (D. Kan. 1997) (“Regulations requiring that agency
employees ‘comprehensively and objectively weigh alternative actions,’ and ‘ensure that asset
integrity and value are maintained,’ hardly constitute the type of ‘specifically prescribed courses
of action’ necessary to invoke the court’s jurisdiction under the FTCA.”).
280
See supra Part III.A.v.
281

See, e.g., Faber v. United States, 56 F.3d 1122, 1126 (9th Cir. 1995).
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Circuit held that a park’s management plan required the Forest Service “to
‘intensify management’ at the Falls by 1) developing a sign plan, 2) formulating
an on-going media program, and 3) providing a presence at the Falls to verbally
warn the public.”282 As such, there was no choice in the matter, and the DFE did
not apply.283 Similarly, in Couzado v. United States, the Southern District of
Florida held language to the effect that “DEA representatives were required to
coordinate with the Embassy Narcotics Coordinator all sensitive or unusual DEA
activities conducted in-country,” to notify U.S. embassies in certain countries of
proposed flight plans, and to keep the Ambassador informed of certain matters.284
Accordingly, there was no “element of choice” involved in the matter, which
made the rule a mandate.285
In Olson, “require” was also used in the Mine Safety and Health
Administration’s procedures handbook that required the agency to “make
inspections of each underground coal or other mine in its entirety at least four
times a year.”286 The Ninth Circuit held the policy to be mandatory.287 Noncompliance with its directive was adjudged negligence unprotected by the
DFE.288
However, while these cases use words from the taxonomy set out above,
other instances finding a mandate illustrate that directives can be formed by other
words when they are put in the imperative mood.289 They can also be weakened
to a mere guideline by the use of some kind of lexical attenuation, which weakens
the force of the statement by use of conditional terms.290 In Autery v. United
States, the Eleventh Circuit held that a letter to the Park Service to the effect that
“[b]lack locust trees are short-lived and due to decay (following borer activity),
break up and drop limbs and tops. Avoid them in new areas; remove them when
282
283
284
285

Id. at 1126 (emphasis added).
Id.
883 F. Supp. 691, 694–95 (S.D. Fla. 1995) (emphasis added).
Id. at 695.

286
Olson v. United States, 362 F.3d 1236, 1239 (9th Cir. 2004), vacated, 546 U.S. 43 (2005),
remanded to 433 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2006).
287

Id. at 1239–40.
Id. But see Freeman v. United States, 556 F.3d 326, 338 (5th Cir. 2009), in which the Fifth
Circuit contextualized the passive use of the verb “require” in the expression “[m]edical support is
required not only at medical facilities, but at casualty evacuation points” by pointing out that “[t]he
ostensibly mandatory language ‘is required,’ when read in light of the broad goals of the Annex . . .
did nothing more than explain the needs that arise in an emergency.” The court concluded that
“[s]atisfaction of those needs was a broad, implied goal allowing for significant choice in its
implementation by federal agencies.” Freeman, 556 F.3d at 338.
288

289
See, e.g., Navarette v. United States, 500 F.3d 914, 917 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that the
language “[d]angerous terrain conditions, such as drop-offs, . . . will be properly marked or fenced”
specifically prescribed the course of action for the employees to follow and did not allow for
discretion).
290

See Autery v. United States, 992 F.2d 1523, 1525 (11th Cir. 1993).
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possible in existing areas,” did not create a mandate.291 The order “to remove”
the trees was conditional upon “possibility” and therefore was merely a
guideline.292
At times, lexical attenuation of an alleged mandate can come by means
of providing examples.293 Words that undo specificity by opening something up
to an array of choices leads to the interpretation that the alleged rule was only a
guideline.294 For example, in Ard v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.,295 the
United States District Court for the Central District of California determined a
claim that the FDIC had “certain articulated duties,” such as a duty “to identify,
monitor, and address risks to deposit insurance funds,” was insufficient to
establish a mandatory action because it was not specifically prescribed by any
regulation, statute, or policy.296 However, the Ninth Circuit in Navarette v.
United States297 held that a checklist specifically identifying the types of things
that qualified under a general term established a mandate, despite the use of
general language about goals and objectives. The particular language in question
was: “[d]angerous terrain conditions, such as drop-offs, etc., will be properly
marked or fenced.” 298
Modals are the means by which a statement’s mandatory or precatory
nature is most established.299 In Pelham v. United States, the district court of New
Jersey found a mandate when:
The contract unequivocally state[d] that “[t]he Contracting
Officer will notify the contractor of noncompliance with these
requirements.” Thus, through use of the word “will,” the
contract clearly accords the contracting officer with oversight
responsibilities over the contractor’s final compliance
obligation. While the contracting officer’s implementation of an
inspection program for detecting safety breaches may be

291

Id. at 1528–30.

292

Id. at 1525.
See, e.g., Valdez v. United States, 56 F.3d 1177, 1180 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he Management
Guidelines’ broad mandate to warn the public of ‘special hazards’ through educational materials,
brochures, pamphlets, and the like necessarily encompasses an element of discretion in identifying
such hazards.”).
294
See id.
293

295
296

770 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (C.D. Cal. 2011).
Id. at 1033, 1036.

297

500 F.3d 914 (9th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 917–18. Courts have also found that language merely instructive in nature is not a
mandate. In Franklin Sav. Corp. v. United States, language to the effect that the party should “take
the necessary steps,” charging the party with certain tasks, “among other things,” and directing
sales based on a variety of factors, was too precatory in nature to amount to a directive. 180 F.3d
1124, 1131–32 (10th Cir. 1999).
298

299

See cases cited infra notes 300–301.
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discretionary, once the officer suspects a safety deficiency, he
or she does not have discretion as to whether or not act upon
it.300
Similarly, the Eastern District Court of California held that a safety policy
indicating “[r]egular inspection of work areas and visitor-use areas shall be
completed and documented,” that “[a]ll employees shall correct hazards,” and
that “[a]ll facilities . . . shall be designed with adopted national standard, codes,
and guidelines” was mandatory.301 On the other hand, the District Court of
Oregon held that fire control policies did not specifically mandate any course of
action when they used the conditional “may” to suggest conduct.302
However, the use of the typically mandatory modal “shall” has not
always been found determinative. In Sierra Club v. Train, the Fifth Circuit took
a wider view of a statutory rule, consulting its legislative history, among other
things, to determine the mandatoriness of its nature:
The most persuasive evidence of Congressional intent is the
wording of the statute. Upon “superficial examination,” §
1319(a)(3)’s statutory language “shall” appears to clearly
mandate that § 1319(a)(3) imposes a non-discretionary duty on
the EPA Administrator. Use of the word “shall” generally
indicates a mandatory intent unless a convincing argument to the
contrary is made. Such an argument may be waged when
extrinsic aids such as the purpose of the statute, the statute as a
whole, or the legislative history indicates an intention that the
statute be given a discretionary effect. Although a salutary rule
of statutory construction prohibits resort to extrinsic aids when
a statute on its face appears to be clear and unambiguous, we
heed a caution which has been repeated with specific reference
to the FWPCAA of 1972 that “(W)hen aid to construction of the
meaning of the words, as used in the statute, is available, there

300

Pelham v. United States, 661 F. Supp. 1063, 1069 (D.N.J. 1987) (citations omitted).

301

Botell v. United States, No. 2:11–cv–01545–TLN–GGH, 2013 WL 3941004, at *2–3, 6–7
(E.D. Cal July 30, 2013) (emphasizing the use of the word “shall” throughout the policy to
conclude that it was a mandatory policy); see also Routh v. United States, 941 F.2d 853, 855 (9th
Cir. 1991) (holding that “shall” established a mandate); Dugard v. United States, 3:11-CV-04718CTB, 2013 WL 6228625 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 27, 2013) (finding six mandates inter alia, on the grounds
that include the use of the modal “shall”); Elson v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 124 Cal. Rptr. 305, 308
(Cal. Ct. App. 1975) (holding that the modal “shall” established a mandate in a Public Utilities
Code).
302

McDougal v. U.S. Forest Service, 195 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1234–37 (D. Or. 2002).
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certainly can be no ‘rule of law’ which forbids its use, however
clear the words may appear on ‘superficial examination.’”303
The court went on to look not only at the legislative history, but also at the
administrative agency’s interpretation of its rule—in this case, the EPA.304 Since
the agency itself construed the rule as merely discretionary, absent evidence that
such a construction was contrary to legislative intent, that interpretation was
sustained.305 Above all, a main reason that the court construed the rule as
discretionary, despite the clear use of the obligatory “shall,” was that “where the
result of one interpretation is unreasonable, while the result of another
interpretation is logical, the latter should prevail.”306 The court held that the
reading suggested by the plaintiff would lead to an untenable set of actions by
the Agency—in this instance, forcing the issuance of abatement orders that
would amount to nothing more than empty gestures.307
Using a similar rationale, the First Circuit in Kelly v. United States held
that the use of the modals “will” and “must” could not be interpreted as requiring
the Drug Enforcement Agency’s Office of Internal Security to conduct an
internal investigation, regardless of how spurious a report of wrong-doing was
judged to be.308 Such an interpretation would frustrate the very objective that the
law was meant to achieve:
Although words like “will” and “must” are generally of
mandatory effect, they may have other meanings and may be
used, as here, in merely a directory sense. Moreover, both the
heading of section 8121 and its lead sentence indicate that the
prescribed obligations are triggered only when the DEA official
in question receives “an allegation or complaint” concerning an
employee. Although neither noun is defined in the Manual, we
believe that, under common usage, it was permissible for the
agency to interpret “allegation” and “complaint” as not
encompassing mere buzznacking. Put another way, reading the

303

Sierra Club v. Train, 557 F.2d 485, 489 (5th Cir. 1977) (citing Train v. Colorado Pub.
Interest Research Grp., Inc., 426 U.S. 1, 10 (1976); Exxon Corp. v. Train, 554 F.2d 1310, 1322
(5th Cir. 1977)) (citations omitted); see also Fanoele v. United States, 975 F. Supp. 1394, 1399–
1400 (D. Kan. 1997) (finding a procedure discretionary despite use of the modal “shall”).
304
Sierra Club, 557 F.2d at 489.
305
Id. The Court went on to say that the legislative history of the statute was rife with dissension
over whether the rule involved was a mandate or a guideline. Id. at 489–90.
306
Id. at 490 (quoting C. SANDS, SUTHERLAND’S STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45.12 (4th ed.
1973)).
307
Id. at 490–91; see also Freeman v. United States, 556 F.3d 326, 339 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing
Ochran v. United States, 117 F.3d 495, 500–01 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that the word “‘shall’ in
describing responsibilities . . . does not necessarily . . . [leave] no room . . . to exercise choice or
judgment . . . ”)).
308

Kelly v. United States, 924 F.2d 355, 360–61 (1st Cir. 1991).
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words as giving DEA’s regional managers discretion to
determine what comprised an “allegation” or “complaint” was a
plausible rendition of the overall text, well within the purview
of the regulation.309
The court went on to say that:
If the Manual were read to mandate that every bit of idle gossip
intimating employee misconduct had to be reported, it would
constitute an open invitation to drug traffickers to make baseless
claims against DEA agents. The legitimate business of the
agency would grind to a halt, its limited resources diverted to
the needless investigation of its own agents rather than the war
against drugs.310
An alternative rationale consistent with the court’s reasoning here is that the
plaintiff’s interpretation of what amounts to an “allegation” or “complaint”
would be unreasonable.311 If every call, regardless of its credibility, were taken
to be an “allegation” or “complaint,” then the statutory purpose of investigating
corruption would be frustrated by spending valuable resources to review obvious
falsehoods.312 In other words, this is not so much a question of whether the
Agency is required to investigate allegations and complaints; they are so
required, just as the language states.313 It is just that some things do not amount
to allegations and complaints.314 Perhaps in this point is a tacit, unstated
admission that there is some judgment involved in the application of every rule,
at least insofar as those charged with its execution must determine whether the
variables it concerns are extant.315 For example, a federal cleaning service

309

Id. (citations omitted); see also Lopez v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 455
Fed. Appx. 427, 433 (5th Cir. 2011) (“That the USMS documents here in question state what the
USMS ‘will’ do is far from dispositive; ‘will’ may be used to express a determination to commit a
future act as easily as a command to perform that act.”).
310
Kelly, 924 F.2d at 361. In language mirroring that of Sierra Club v. Train, the Court said
that “an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations is entitled to substantial deference and will
ordinarily be accorded controlling weight unless clearly erroneous.” Id. (citing 557 F.2d 485, 489
(5th Cir. 1977)). This is of course in accordance with Chevron deference. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc.
v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844–45 (1984).
See Sierra Club, 557 F.2d at 490 (quoting C. SANDS, SUTHERLAND’S STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 45.12 (4th ed. 1973)).
311

312
313

See Kelly, 924 F.2d at 361.
See id. at 360–61.

314
See id. (“[T]he prescribed obligations are triggered only when the DEA official in question
receives ‘an allegation or complaint’ concerning an employee.”).
315
See, e.g., id. (stating that the agency charged with the duty to execute regulation could
exercises discretion to determine whether such duty arose on the first place by distinguishing
complaints/allegations from mere gossip).
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charged with the mandate to “lock all doors upon leaving the building,” must
first determine whether they are open or not before any question of
mandatoriness even comes into play.
Sometimes a purported rule includes both mandatory and precatory
language. In that event, other indicators break the tie—particularly, the
specificity with which the prescribed actions are set out.316 In Greene v. United
States, the Eastern District of California held that a set of building standards was
mandatory because it used language such as “requires,” “maximum extent,” and
“shall comply.”317 An exception for “feasibility”—indicating that the
government need not comply with the building codes if it was impossible to do
so—did not make the policy discretionary.318 On the other hand, in Terbush v.
United States¸ the Ninth Circuit stated that the existence of some mandatory
language does not eliminate discretion when an objective’s broader goals require
an element of discretion.319 Therefore, it seems that the broader context—which
requires weighing, balancing, and judgment-calls—can override mandatory
language.320 However, an “escape-hatch” clause that attempts to make
everything ultimately discretionary will not necessarily undo a list of directives
made with “Order” verbs and mandatory modals. Such was the case in Navarette
v. United States, where an attempt to diffuse the specificity of a checklist by
including some general terms was held to be an ineffective attempt to preserve
discretion.321

316

See cases cited infra notes 319.

317

Greene v. United States, 207 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1118, 1121 (E.D. Cal. 2002).
Id. at 1120–22. In Heinrich ex. rel. Heinrich v. Sweet, the alleged rule involved a mixture
of precatory and mandatory language. 62 F. Supp. 2d 282, 324–25 (D. Mass. 1999). The court held
that the situation permitted it to consult “informal indicia” in the form of correspondence to
interpret a statement that “no substance known to be, or suspected of being . . . harmful . . . should
be given to human beings . . . without informed consent.” Id. The evidence pointed to a mandate,
which made the DFE inapplicable. Id.
319
516 F.3d 1125, 1139–40 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Lopez v. U.S. Immigration & Customs
Enforcement, 455 Fed. Appx. 427, 433 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing Freeman v. United States, 455 F.3d
326, 378 (5th Cir. 2008)) (“As this court has found, many policy statements couched in seemingly
mandatory language ultimately present only ‘generalized precatory or aspirational language that is
too general to prescribe a specific course of action for an agency or employee to follow.’”);
Franklin Sav. Corp. v. United States, 180 F.3d 1124, 1131–32 (10th Cir. 1999) (“None of the four
constitutes a ‘specific and mandatory requirement’ as this court’s precedents define that term.
Instead, they all state general goals, or sets of objectives to balance, in precatory rather than
mandatory language.”); Magee v. United States, 121 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding that a
procedure involving the undertaking of a series of steps in order to make a decision did not
constitute a particularized course of action); Singh v. S. Asian Soc’y of George Washington Univ.,
572 F. Supp. 2d 11, 14 (D.D.C. 2008) (citing Fanoele v. United States, 975 F. Supp. 1394, 1400
(D. Kan. 1997) and holding that the use of “predominantly precatory language” invested discretion,
not obligation, in the decision maker).
320
See cases cited supra note 319.
318

321

See, e.g., Navarette v. United States, 500 F.3d 914, 917–18 (9th Cir. 2007).
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In summary, courts will take into consideration the purpose of the
alleged rule, as well as its broader objectives and context, despite the tenor of the
words used—whether they be mandatory words or precatory words. However,
by and large, the semantic value of the verbs,322 as well as that of the modals
used, are honored when the terms are clear.
3. Specificity
By far, the degree of specificity involved is the most determinative of
the three aspects of the essential condition used by courts to determine whether
a statement is a mandate or a guideline.323 The other two aspects, form and
language, play their roles, but the number of times courts have based their
holding on matters of detail dwarfs all others. Indeed, the importance of
specificity to mandates can be seen as fundamentally constitutive of them.
The courts have long said that the DFE will not apply if the statement in
question is specific: “a general regulation or policy . . . does not remove
discretion unless it specifically prescribes a course of conduct.”324 If the alleged
rule consists of nothing more than broad generalities and high aspirations,
without expressly and directly explaining how those aspirations are to take place,
it remains at the level of platitude.325 Like a resolution,326 it expresses an intent
to achieve a goal, or the adoption of a path that leads in a certain direction, but
falls short of mandatory status.327
To caricature the point as a means of making it, platitudes such as “Be
safe” and “Do good,” however heartfelt, do not amount to orders of any type
because they imply discretion in the means by which the “safe” can be
accomplished or the “good” can be employed. In other words, if the statement

322

See supra Part III.A.1.v.

323

See, e.g., Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536 (1988).
Kelly v. United States, 241 F.3d 755, 761 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Baker v. San Carlos
Irrigation Project Dist., 176 F. Supp. 2d 970, 977 (D. Ariz. 2001) (holding that a directive must be
mandatory and sufficiently specific), rev’d, 58 Fed. Appx. 303 (9th Cir. 2003). The Baker court is
inexact in its phraseology when it uses the conjunctive “and;” one of the factors—if not the most
important factor—in deciding mandatoriness is specificity. Baker, 176 F. Supp. 2d at 977. It is an
aspect of mandatoriness, not a separate requirement. Id.
325
See, e.g., Terbush v. United States, 516 F.3d 1125, 1132 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[The] provision
is not a mandatory and specific policy, and the language itself implicates the NPS’s broader
mandate to balance access with conservation.”).
324

326

See supra text accompanying notes 144–146 (discussing the nature of resolution).
The list of cases that have found language too broad to comprise a mandate are numerous.
See, e.g., Sabow v. United States, 93. F.3d 1445, 1452–53 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding the language of
the Naval Investigative Service investigation guidelines too broad to compromise a mandate);
Blackburn v. United States, 100 F.3d 1426, 1430–33 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding the NPS policy
guidelines too broad to compromise a mandate); Valdez v. United States, 56 F.3d 1177, 1179–80
(9th Cir. 1995) (finding the NPS policy guidelines too broad to compromise a mandate).
327
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stays at this level of abstraction, without a clear course of action that must be
taken, the first prong of the DFE is not met.328
To put things in yet a third way—a principle precedes the mandate, and
ultimately cannot be realized without it, but is not to be confused with the
mandate.329 “The quarters should be kept safe and operational at all times” is a
principle or goal that cannot be realized without a definitive course of action that
brings it to pass, such as directives to “lock all doors” and “conduct monthly
maintenance checks.”330 Without the latter, there is discretion in the
implementation, a fact that is intrinsically at odds with obligatory conduct.331
A legal articulation of the above can be found in Shansky v. United
States, in which the First Circuit explains the difference between a “goal” and a
“mandate”:
[The Plaintiff] finds succor in a broadly worded expression of a
general policy goal contained in the Park Service’s operating
manual to the effect that “[t]he saving of human life will take
precedence over all other management actions.” But this
passage does not specifically prescribe that any particular safety
measure be employed at any particular place or in any particular
facility. To the contrary, it suggests that the Park Service and its
functionaries will have to make discretionary judgments about
how to apply concretely the aspirational goal embedded in the
statement. Statements made at this level of generality do not
satisfy . . . specific prescription requirement. Were the law
otherwise, the discretionary function exception would be a dead
letter.332
The Tenth Circuit also makes the distinction in Tippett v. United States, in which
the court in a more succinct fashion states that “[t]he general goal of protecting
human life in the nation’s national parks is not the kind of specific mandatory
directive that operated to divest [the park ranger] of discretion in the situation he
faced.”333 Obviously, a generality so broad that it requires discretion to
328
329

See cases cited supra note 319.
In this context, a principle of some sort is a preparatory condition to a mandate.

330
See, e.g., Valdez, 56 F.3d at 1180 (stating that “[w]hile the said policy guidelines certainly
outline general policy goals regarding visitor safety, the means by which NPS employees meet
these goals necessarily involves an exercise of discretion.”).
331
See cases cited supra note 319.
332

Shansky v. United States, 164 F.3d 688, 691 (1st Cir. 1999) (citations omitted).
Tippett v. United States, 108 F.3d 1194, 1197 (10th Cir. 1997); see also Green v. United
States, 630 F.3d 1245, 1250 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that regulations did not proscribe a specific
course of action for lighting backfires); Franklin Sav. Corp. v. United States, 180 F.3d 1124, 1132
(10th Cir. 1999) (finding the alleged mandate “neither elaborates [a] general command nor
specifies how to perform the discretionary task of balancing timeliness, efficiency, and return. The
final passage lists four broad considerations to balance, in an unspecified calculus, without
333
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implement is a matter of judgment, and a matter of judgment is necessarily a
matter of policy, which the DFE protects from being second-guessed.334
Excessive breadth, therefore, leads not only to a failure of the first prong, but
also to a failure of the second prong of the DFE.335
Another way that courts have articulated, however circuitously, the need
for specificity in a mandate is by making the point that a mandate must have a
certain scope. In other words, there must be both a clear course of action for
actuating a principle and the principle must be capable of actuation. In Deuser v.
Vecera, an Eighth Circuit opinion, park rangers released a drunk man that they
had detained during a city festival.336 He later wandered onto a highway and was
killed.337 The decedent’s family sued under the FTCA, claiming that the Park
Service did not have the authority to terminate an arrest, once made.338 In holding
that the service’s standard operating procedures did not mandate a policy in these
circumstances, the Eighth Circuit said:
It would be impossible to put into a manual every possible
scenario a ranger might encounter, and then to decide in advance
for the ranger whether an arrest should be made and, once made,
under what circumstances an arrest could be terminated. Just as
the rangers had discretion to decide (within constitutional limits,

specifying a course of action for the complex task of managing asset sales.”); C.R.S. v. United
States, 11 F.3d 791, 796 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that blood screening measures described no
particular type of screen, and, therefore, left the decision open to discretionary exercise); Baum v.
United States, 986 F.2d 716, 721–22 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding that the legislative advisement for
the Park Service “to provide a . . . safe[ ] and suitable approach for passenger-vehicle traffic” was
“general, sweeping language . . . insufficient to remove questions of design and
construction . . . .”); Daigle v. Shell Oil Co., 972 F.2d 1527, 1540–41 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding
that a set of “minimum attainments” were not mandates because they set no course of action);
Walding v. United States, 955 F. Supp. 2d 759, 786–87 (W.D. Tex. 2013) (holding that criminal
laws were “written at a level of generality such that they fail to prescribe a nondiscretionary course
of action”). But see McMichael v. United States, 856 F.2d 1026, 1033 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding that
a department policy prescribed a specific course of action to take in an electrical storm); Aslakson
v. United States, 790 F.2d 688, 693 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding that a policy set forth a specific course
of action for the elevation of electrical lines); Harvey v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Wabash Cnty., 416
N.E.2d 1296, 1299 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that adherence to a traffic manual was prescribed
by statute).
334
See United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467
U.S. 797, 798 (1984) (stating that the DFE’s legislative intent was to protect the government from
“second-guessing” when it made decisions “grounded in social, economic, and political policy”).
See United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 324 (1991) (stating that “if a regulation allows
the employee discretion, the very existence of the regulation creates a strong presumption that a
discretionary act authorized by the regulation involves consideration of the same policies which
led to the promulgation of the regulations.”).
335

336
337
338

Deuser v. Vecera, 139 F.3d 1190, 1192 (8th Cir. 1998).
Id.
Id.
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of course) when and whether to make an arrest, so they had—
and here exercised—discretion to terminate an arrest without
charging the suspect. Under the terms of the Handbook, that
discretion became even broader during the Fair. We hold that
terminating Deuser’s arrest, that is, releasing him without
charging him with a crime, was a discretionary function reserved
to the judgment of the rangers.339
The point also relates to the essential condition, in that a mandate cannot be
recognizable as such if it is impossible to articulate in a set of terms. 340 This
seems to admit something essential about directives: they can anticipate a certain
decided set of circumstances related to a principle that is of a certain scope.341
What a police officer or park ranger must do in every circumstance cannot
possibly be articulated;342 it is highly unlikely that what a police officer or park
ranger must do in circumstances involving all intoxicated or belligerent detainees
can be mandated;343 it is more likely that what a police officer or park ranger
must do when a belligerent detainee has a weapon and is threatening to shoot can
be articulated,344 which makes a mandate of such a statement made by the proper
authority, to the proper audience, in the proper form, using the proper language,
and without any controverting sincerity evidence.345
As stated above, when there is a stated set of factors for the government
to apply in what is consummately a governmental function—weighing,
balancing, and judging—the circumstances are ripe for a government victory.346
In Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Department of Agriculture,347 the plaintiff argued that
the government was required to close a forest to public access;348 by not doing
so, the plaintiff’s land was damaged.349 The applicable plan for closure of the
woods contained a specific five factor assessment.350 With regard to those
factors, the district court of Oregon reasoned as follows:

339

Id. at 1195.

340

See supra Part III.A.iv (discussing Essential Conditions).
See generally Deuser, 139 F.3d at 1190.

341
342
343

See, e.g., id. at 1195.
See, e.g., id.

344
See, e.g., McMichael v. United States, 856 F.2d 1026, 1033 (8th Cir. 1988) (stating that “the
Department policy prescribed a course of action for the inspector to follow in the event of any
electrical storm, and the inspector had no choice but to adhere to that directive”).
345
See supra Part III.A.1.iv (describing felicity conditions for a mandate).
346
347
348
349
350

See case cited supra note 304.
782 F. Supp. 1460 (D. Or. 1991).
Id. at 1461.
Id.
Id. at 1464.
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The existence of the five factors does not require that the forest
be closed. Rather, the five factors would have to exist to
completely close the woods, but the mere existence of these
factors does not mandate that the woods be closed, just that the
threshold requirement has been met and the woods may be
closed. The final decision whether to close the forest remained
with Mr. Grace, depending upon his evaluation and weighing of
the public’s need for open forests and the costs entailed with
closing the forests against the danger of fire.351
Regardless of how specific the factors were, they need not lead to closure.352
Specificity is a hallmark of mandates,353 but other features can undo the
mandatoriness of the statement.354
However, an argument that answers the “weighing of factors”
circumstances was set out by the Eighth Circuit in Appley Brothers v. United
States.355 There, the court distinguished between the discretion to issue a
revocation order after consulting certain data and a mandate to consult that data:
In conducting the August 5 inspection, the inspectors violated
not only the mandatory requirements of the grain inspector’s
handbook, but also the stated purpose of their inspection. The
inspectors had no discretion on August 5 as to whether they
should check to see if Bird Grain had cured the deficiencies
found on April 1 and to issue a new TW–125 reporting that
information . . . . The fact that there is no written policy
mandating that the U.S.D.A. revoke Bird Grain’s license if
inspectors discover substantial shortages is not fatal to Appley
Brothers’ argument that the discretionary function does not
apply. Although the revocation order itself is discretionary, the
inspectors’ failure to see if Bird Grain cleared the violations
noted in the April 1 report prevented the Secretary from
exercising discretion to decide whether to revoke Bird Grain’s
license.356

351

Id. at 1465.

352

See id. at 1464–65.
See Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536 (1988) (“[T]he discretionary function
exception will not apply when a federal statute, regulation, or policy specifically prescribes a
course of action for an employee to follow.”).
353

354
355
356

See cases cited supra note 333.
7 F.3d 720 (8th Cir. 1993).
Id. at 725–26 (citations omitted).
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In other words, while the inspector retained the discretion to issue the order once
he had made the necessary check, he had no authority not to make the check.357
Regardless of how much weighing and judging the government must do, if the
mandate requires that the government weigh and judge, it must do so.358 Failure
will result in the inapplicability of the DFE.359
V. A FACTORS APPROACH TO DISTINGUISHING MANDATES FROM GUIDELINES
As is apparent from the above discussion of the DFE, for some time the
courts have implicitly, and unwittingly, relied upon the logic that underpins the
linguistic distinctions explained in this Article. However, they have struggled to
articulate a clear analytic framework for use in the tort claims area. This article
will now explain such a framework for the judiciary’s use.
By now it is apparent that from the scientific perspective provided by the
linguistic analysis of speech acts, certain facts supply information necessary as
to whether a particular statement is a mandate or a guideline.360 Their credibility
is owing to the fact that they comport with the felicity conditions that establish
mandates and distinguish them from guidelines.361 As such, this information can
be formed into a set of factors for use by both practitioners and judges—the
former when arguing that a statement was or was not a mandate, the latter when
deciding the same. The factors are as follows:
1. Parties: Who made the statement and to whom was the
statement made? Did the speaker have the requisite
authority to speak? Did the audience have the requisite
authority and power to carry out the alleged mandate?
This factor corresponds to the preparatory condition for a mandate.362 It underlies
the rationale of those cases described in Part IV that turn upon the speaker and
the audience. Unless the proper parties are involved, a statement cannot be a
mandate.
2. Custom and Usage: How was the alleged mandate
interpreted by the relevant parties? How long was this
understanding in place? How was the alleged mandate
enforced?

357

See id.
See id. (indicating that before the inspector can exercise discretion, he has to conduct an
inspection).
359
See, e.g., id.
358

360
361
362

See supra Part IV.
See supra Part III.A.1.iv (describing felicity conditions).
See supra Parts III.A.1.iv, IV.A.
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This factor corresponds to the sincerity condition for a mandate, and is
informed by means of the statement’s perlocutionary effect.363 It underlies the
rationale of those cases described in Part IV that turn upon the way that the
statement was considered by the parties and the attitudes they took toward it.
Failure to treat a mandate as a mandate can compromise an appreciation of its
nature.364
3. Expression: How formal were the means by which the
alleged mandate was communicated? What kind of
language was used (mandatory or precatory)? How specific
was the alleged mandate?
This factor corresponds to the essential condition for a mandate.365 It
underlies the rationale of those cases described in Part IV that turn upon the
language used, how it was conveyed, and how clear it was. A mandate must be
recognizable as such—the form it takes, the words that comprise it, and the
specificity with which it is related are key to that recognition.
Although all of the above factors are relevant to the mandate/guideline
inquiry, some points can be made about how courts have applied and prioritized
them. Evidence as to the expression of the mandate has held most sway in finding
a statement to be a mandate, with specificity being the most determinative aspect,
followed by language, then form.366 While the importance of custom and usage
can be attenuated by a clear expression of the mandate, when that clarity is
lacking, courts consult prior history to resolve the ambiguity.367 And although a
challenge on the grounds that the proper parties were not involved in the
communication of the mandate is rare, it is a significant factor. Still, a history of
custom and usage whereby an alleged mandate was treated as such despite the
fact that the rule-giver did not actually have the authority to hand down the rule,
or the rule-performer did not actually have the power to actuate it, would
logically weigh towards finding a mandate on estoppel grounds.368
Of course, use of these factors might also be seen along a continuum
akin to the formalist vs. instrumentalist approaches to statutory interpretation.369
363

See supra Parts III.A.1.iii, III.A.1.iv, IV.B.

364

See supra Parts III.A.1.iii (discussing the recognizability of an utterance).
See supra Part III.A.1.iv.

365
366

See cases cited supra note 333.
See, e.g., Kelly v. United States, 924 F.2d 355, 360–61 (1st Cir. 1991) (examining the
customary treatment of the rule in question to determine its nature).
368
See supra notes 253–256 and accompanying text.
367

369
Another parallel to this factors approach would be contractual interpretation. From a policy
standpoint, ambiguities in a contract are typically construed against the drafter, as he “controls the
pen.” This is the doctrine of contra proferentem, ancient in origin. See generally David Horton,
Flipping The Script: Contra Proferentem and Standard Form Contracts, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 431
(2009); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 (1981). Risk allocation also provides a
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If the “plain meaning” of the words is clear, no other evidence need be consulted,
or so goes the argument.370 The degree to which the other factors are taken into
account—be they prior history, evidence of authority, etc. would be akin to
seeking elucidation from legislative history and other external determinants. 371
Further, the degree to which specificity and clarity can be gleaned from other
sources is akin to courts deciding to consult the canons of statutory interpretation,
such as Expressio unius (“the express mention of one thing excludes all others”),
In pari materia (“meaning can be gleaned from other rules upon the same matter
or subject”), and Noscitur a soccis (“a word is known by the company it keeps”).
372

Hopefully, the factors set forth here will provide a clear and precise tool
by which courts can approach the often complex, muddled area of determining
when a statement should be classified as a rule or a suggestion, as an “ought” or
a “must.”
VI. CONCLUSION
It is worth noting that often when courts hold that the DFE does not
apply, they say that “the statement told X to do something, but did not tell him
how to do it,” and therefore X acted “at his discretion.”373 What the courts should
be saying is that because it was not clear what X should do, he was not given a
mandate; the DFE does not apply, but for the reason that anything so generally
stated stays at the level of the goal, the objective, the guideline. Mandates must
be clear, stated to the right party, by the right party, through the right means, and
treated as mandates by all involved. In so doing, they comport with what the law,
and language, requires for them to be.
The courts task is a difficult one, balancing the needs of plaintiffs whose
injuries are no less grave simply because the tortfeasor is the government against
the needs of government agencies whose tasks of public service lie somewhere
between an art and a science, between absolute duties and subjective

similar parallel: “[R]isk is best borne by the party who makes the mistake than by some wholly
innocent party.” E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, ALLEVIATING MISTAKES: REVERSAL AND FORGIVENESS
FOR FLAWED PERCEPTIONS (needs the page number and the year of edition) (quoting RICHARD
EPSTEIN, TORTS § 1.4.2 at 13 (1999)).
370
See Steven W. Feldman & James A. DeLanis, Resolving Contractual Ambiguity in
Tennessee: A Systematic Approach, 68 TENN. L. REV. 73, 80–81 (2000).
371
See Ellen P. Aprill & Nancy Staudt, Theories of Statutory Interpretation (and Their Limits),
38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1899, 1900–01 (2005).
372
See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 521–35
(1960).
373
See, e.g., Franklin Sav. Corp. v. United States, 180 F.3d 1124, 1131–32 (10th Cir. 1999)
(holding that “[f]our of the five requirements to maintain asset values, avoid sales that reduce
franchise value, maximize value, and schedule sales based on various concerns . . . state[d] general
goals . . . in precatory rather than mandatory language”).
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interpretations. When immunity is at stake, the costs are always high; as such, a
careful, scientific determination of language can benefit not only interpreters but
also drafters, providing a precise articulation of what is expected and who is
accountable, and thereby also benefitting the public at large, whose safety and
well-being are served in the process.

